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ABSTRACT
Three experiments were conducted on normal functioning undergraduate 
university students to examine the role of configural processing in a set of living and non­
living items. In Experiment 1 the participants were required to indicate whether a line 
drawing matched a word that preceded it. Half of the pictures depicted animals and half 
depicted clothing. Each picture was presented once in the upright position and once in the 
inverted position. The results indicated that inversion of the pictures of animals increased 
reaction times (RTs) more than inversion of the pictures of clothing, compared to pictures 
presented in the upright orientation. In Experiment 2 participants were required to 
categorize the same set of pictures used in Experiment 1. The pictures were again 
presented in upright and inverted orientations. In contrast to Experiment 1 inversion of 
the pictures increased RTs equally for the animals and the clothing. In Experiment 3 
participants performed the same task as in Experiment 1. However, instead of clothing, 
pictures of non-living items that were hypothesized to encourage configural processing 
were used. Inversion of the pictures increased RTs equally for the animals and the set of 
non-living items.
The results are conceptualized as supporting the hypothesis that living things are 
processed more configurally than are non-living artefacts because of visual crowding 
(Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987) within the category of living things. The relevance of 
these findings to semantic category deficits for living things is discussed. It is 
hypothesized that damage to a part of the brain necessary for processing the configural 
relationships of objects can account for some of the instances of category specific deficits 
for living things.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental subject of inquiry, not just for psychology but for all social and 
biological science, involves the organization of information in the brain. Perhaps some of 
the most informative neuropsychological findings concerning this issue come from 
patients who can recognize some categories of objects but not others. Warrington and 
Shallice (1984) described a patient who sustained temporal lobe damage following herpes 
simplex encephalitis and was able to name and give accurate descriptions of nonliving 
artefacts, but had very limited knowledge for living things. For example, the patient was 
able to describe a compass as “tools for telling the direction you are going” and a 
briefcase as “a small case used by students to carry papers.” However, when asked to 
describe a parrot he said, “don’t know,” and for a snail he responded “an insect animal.”
The above examples are used to illustrate the presence of an overall pattern of 
impaired semantic knowledge for living things with preserved knowledge for nonliving 
things. Other patients present with the opposite pattern of results, specifically intact 
knowledge for living things and impaired knowledge for nonliving artefacts. This double 
dissociation has been observed for a number of different categories of knowledge. The 
symptoms of the first group of patients dissociate knowledge for living things from 
knowledge of other objects, and symptoms of the second group dissociate knowledge for 
nonliving artefacts from that of living things.
Other neuropsychological double dissociations that have been observed include 
ones for common vs. proper names, nouns vs. verbs, and abstract vs. concrete words. The 
presence of these double dissociations has been taken as evidence that different neural 
substrates underlie the processing of each. However, as Van Orden, Pennington, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Stone (2001) state, the hypothesis that double dissociations indicate that different neural 
substrates are responsible for performing different cognitive processes is predicated on 
the assumption of modularity of brain functions. In contrast, many researchers have made 
the logical mistake of accepting the occurrence of double dissociations as proof of 
modularity. Van Orden et al. (2001) critique not only the application of double 
dissociations to theories of modularity, but the pursuit of defining neuropsychological 
modules at all. Firstly, modularity theories fail to explicate criteria necessary for the 
definition of pure case dissociations. Thus, the characteristics that define pure lesions of 
any module are not clear since the existence of the module is based on the presentation of 
cases. This results in the constant pursuit of a pure case and an inevitable expansion of 
exclusionary criteria. Secondly, because modularity places no limit on the number of 
fractionations, dissociations translate into increasingly more fine-grained modules. For 
example, an initial dissociation observed between nouns and verbs led to an observed 
fractionation between living and non-living things, which has now been further 
fractionated within the living things category to distinguish among animals, plants, and 
body parts.
Van Orden et al’s (2001) compelling arguments notwithstanding, the investigation 
into double dissociations has had some practical utility in providing direction for 
understanding the organization of the mind and brain. Furthermore, investigating the 
dissociation observed between living and non-living artefacts does not require the 
acceptance of the modularity hypothesis. Quite the contrary, studies conducted in this 
area have been aimed at distinguishing between predictions made by several modular 
theories, connectionist theories, and theories that argue that the dissociation occurs as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
function of stimulus properties and not of brain organization. Thus, the modular 
hypothesis of living and non-living artefacts is being tested rather than assumed.
The distinction between living and non-living things has encouraged a great deal 
of research involving the theoretical underpinnings of category specific deficits for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, results initially presented by Warrington and Shallice (1984) 
and subsequently corroborated by numerous studies (Basso, Capitani, & Laiacona, 1988; 
Caramazza& Shelton, 1998; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; Farah & Wallace, 1992; 
Humphreys & Riddoch, 1988; Kolinsky et al. 2001; Laiacona, Capitani, & Barbarotto, 
1997; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988) were very persuasive and consistent across different 
testing conditions. Secondly, these results inspired the development of a very influential 
theory by Warrington and Shallice (1984) that suggested that the living/non-living 
dissociation was actually a product of the differential weightings of visual-perceptual and 
functional attributes between living and non-living items. For instance, the identification 
of a living thing will depend primarily on its visual features, whereas identification of a 
non-living artefact such as a tool will rely less on visual and more on functional 
attributes. Finally, researchers took particular note of the living/non-living dichotomy 
presented by Warrington and Shallice (1984) because it was reported in 4 patients 
recovering from Herpes Simplex Encephalitis (HSE). This suggests that HSE results in a 
particular pattern of brain pathology that can be associated with a specific pattern of 
deficits. Such a link was seen to hold promise for establishing specific neuro-anatomical 
correlates to well defined cognitive processes.
Warrington and Shallice’s (1984) theory also prompted a great deal of research 
activity aimed at challenging its predictions which in turn gave rise to the development of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
alternative explanations of the living/non-living dichotomy. Caramazza and Shelton 
(1998) argued that the dissociation between living and non-living artefacts occurs 
because they are represented in the brain by distinct neurological structures. They 
suggested that evolutionary pressures resulted in neural structures that are dedicated 
strictly to the processing of information from living items. Gonnerman, Anderson, and 
Devlin (1997), on the other hand, suggested that the dissociation between living and non­
living artefacts occurs because of a different number of interconnections between sensory 
and functional attributes in these categories, rather than a differential weighting of 
sensory and functional attributes. Humphreys and Forde (2001) proposed the hierarchical 
interactive theory (HIT) in which categorical deficits arise because of greater visual and 
semantic similarity between categories of living items than between categories of 
nonliving things. Each of the above theories will be discussed in greater detail following 
a brief overview of the literature regarding the nature of semantic information in the 
human brain. Most relevant to this dissertation is a consideration of whether semantic 
information is represented in separate stores related to the modality of input (a separate 
store for visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, motor, and verbal inputs) or in a single 
unitary semantic system that is amodal.
Unitary Versus Multiple Semantic Systems 
Patients with category-specific deficits such as those described above do not 
appear to have difficulties that are confined to problems within a specific sensory 
modality, but are instead found for particular categories on questioning across multiple 
sensory modalities. Such generality suggests that the deficits relate to semantic memory
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and findings from these patients have been used to inform theories of the nature of 
semantic memory.
Semantic memory has traditionally been defined as the system responsible for 
storing information about the meanings of objects, concepts, and facts. For example, our 
semantic memory system contains the knowledge that a dog has fur, ears, eyes, a snout, 
and that it barks, is often walked with a leash, and can be used as a seeing-eye-dog. Some 
of this knowledge represents visual features, auditory features, motor features, and 
associations to other objects. A rudimentary analysis of the “contents” of what we refer to 
as semantic memory suggests that this is not a unitary system, but an interaction of 
systems that involve aspects of visual memory, auditory memory, motor memory, and 
verbal memory. However, the existence of category-specific deficits has led researchers 
to reconsider the possibility of a unitary semantic store.
Supporters of the single semantic system models suggest that information within 
semantic memory is amodal and that memory for sensorial features is accomplished by 
pre-semantic systems that hold modality specific information. Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, 
and Romani (1990) argue that evidence that has been cited in favour of the multiple 
semantics hypothesis is equally compatible with variants of the single semantic system 
model. For instance, Shallice (1988) described three lines of evidence in support of a 
multiple semantic system model: 1) the existence of patients who show poor naming 
abilities that are restricted to one modality of input, despite evidence to suggest that 
access to semantic information through that modality is intact; 2) disproportionate 
memory impairments in one modality over another; and 3) the fact that individual’s 
response times are helped more by priming within one modality than priming within
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
another. In the multiple semantic system model it is hypothesized, based on the above 
findings, that different parts (modalities) of the semantic system can be accessed, without 
necessarily accessing the other parts; a phenomenon that Caramazza et al. (1990) termed 
“privileged access”.
Caramazza et al. (1990) suggest, however, that a unitary semantic system model 
can also account for privileged access. A unitary semantic system hypothesis makes the 
assumption that the word “spoon” activates the full semantic representation of this 
concept in the same way that seeing a picture of a “spoon” does. However, Caramazza et 
al. (1990) state that it is also possible that the perceptual features of the presentation of 
the “spoon” will activate other semantic representations, such as those concerning the 
metallic colour or the representation of a handle. Thus, it is possible through the 
presentation of objects, that specific perceptual features will be given this “privileged 
access” without making the assumption of multiple separate semantic systems.
In contrast to the single, amodal semantic system model, Damasio (1990) 
proposed a multi-modal model in which semantic memory consists of different types of 
sensory and sensorimotor information. Any given item activates a pattern of activation 
across the different sensory and sensorimotor cortices. This results in a highly distributed 
semantic system in which various “feature fragments” are stored in the cortex that 
corresponds to each particular sensory modality and motor cortex. Thus, the 
representation for an apple would consist of distributed activation for the smell in the 
olfactory cortex, the visual features in the visual cortex, auditory associations in the 
auditory cortex, and motor associations in the motor cortex. There is also research 
suggesting that the emotional connections of an item are an important component of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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semantic representation (Brousseau & Buchanan, 2004). Information from different 
sensory modalities is integrated at convergence zones in higher level association cortex. 
Recognition of an object can only occur once a sufficient number of “feature fragments” 
are activated.
Each of the theories of category specific deficits described in this paper could be 
categorized very broadly as a hypothesis based on an amodal semantic system or a multi­
modal system. The categorical hypothesis (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) and the 
interconnections hypothesis (Gonnerman et al., 1997) are examples of the former while 
the sensory/functional hypothesis (Warrington and Shallice, 1984) and the HIT model 
(Humphreys and Forde, 2001) are examples of the latter. Like these multi-modal 
perspectives, the model of categorical deficits described in this dissertation emphasizes 
visual processing and de-emphasizes a “core” semantic processor.
Sensory/Functional Hypothesis 
The sensory/functional account of category-specific deficits assumes that 
knowledge in semantic memory is organized such that damage to a specific area of the 
brain will result in categorical dissociations even though memory may not be organized 
by semantic category. The sensory/functional hypothesis proposed by Warrington and 
Shallice (1984) was based on findings from a series of eight controlled experiments 
conducted on four patients who had partially recovered from HSE1.
because of verbal limitations two of the four patients were only able to participate in one 
of the eight experiments.
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As a measure of overall visual and verbal agnosia, in the first experiment the two 
patients were required to name and describe 40 clear line drawings of mostly inanimate 
objects. Following a short interval they were then required to provide definitions to the 
object names presented auditorily. The researchers identified a moderately severe visual 
and verbal agnosia in both patients. In subsequent experiments both patients presented 
with a significant discrepancy in their ability to identify living versus non-living artefacts. 
Although they were usually able to name the superordinate category for both categories 
their ability to name and define living things was severely impaired compared to a 
significantly more preserved ability to identify non-living artefacts. Both patients also 
showed significant impairment in their ability to identify food items and one of the 
patients showed a preserved ability to define abstract words, but a moderately severe 
deficit in defining concrete words. The two patients presenting with more severe verbal 
impairments were administered a spoken word/picture matching task, requiring them to 
identify animals, foods, and inanimate objects. These two patients also demonstrated 
poorer performance on the animal and food categories than on the inanimate objects 
category.
The above results clearly show categorical deficits for both living things and 
foods, in comparison to a well-preserved ability to identify non-living artefacts in all four 
patients. The performance differences between categories was present across tasks 
(verbal description, naming, mimed responses, and picture/word matching) and thus 
across input modalities.
In developing a convincing argument for the sensory/functional hypothesis 
alternative explanations first had to be discounted. Although all four patients had a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
relatively severe amnesic syndrome, the authors rejected the hypothesis that this was 
entirely responsible for the deficits observed in these patients. If this hypothesis were 
accurate, it would be necessary for all reported cases of category specific deficits to occur 
in conjunction with a severe amnesic syndrome, which is not the case (Warrington,
1975). The category specificity of the deficits also makes an explanation involving a 
visual processing deficit untenable (although this claim will be challenged in the present 
paper). More importantly, the fact that the deficit persists across testing in different 
sensory modalities implicates a semantic deficit. Likewise, because the deficit persisted 
on the word/picture matching tasks any argument that the results occurred because of an 
impoverished expressive vocabulary is discredited. In sum, it appears as though the 
dichotomy observed in these four patients was the result of a semantic processing deficit.
As further support for the hypothesis that these patients are presenting with a 
specific pattern of impairment and preservation of different semantic categories, 
Warrington and McCarthy (1987) documented a patient with a reversed pattern of 
category-specific deficit. While the four patients studied by Warrington and Shallice 
(1984) presented with an impairment in their knowledge of living things and foods and a 
preservation of knowledge of non-living artefacts, Warrington and McCarthy (1987) 
investigated a patient with semantic deficits for non-living artefacts with preserved 
knowledge of foods and living things.
To explain the categorical dissociation observed in their initial four patients 
Warrington and Shallice (1984) proposed that knowledge of non-living artefacts is 
different from that of living things and foods. More specifically, when distinguishing 
between different living things and foods one must rely on knowledge of sensory features
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
such as size, colour, shape, and texture. For instance, to distinguish between a leopard 
and a tiger, precise visual information (e.g., stripes versus spots) must be accessed. In 
contrast, non-living artefacts are more typically defined by their function. Thus, the 
distinction between a screw and a nail is related primarily to how they are used (i.e. a nail 
is inserted using a hammer and a screw is inserted using a screwdriver). The sensory 
features of a screw can vary considerably, but the functional definition remains constant. 
Food and living things, on the other hand, have very few identifiable, unique functional 
features. Although the identification of non-living artefacts will require the accessing of 
some sensory features and the identification of some foods and living things will consist 
of some functional features, the weighting of these feature types within each category 
differs. Therefore, any damage that occurs to the system underlying the identification of 
sensory features will differentially affect foods and living things, whereas damage that 
occurs to the system sub-serving functional features will have a greater impact on the 
processing of non-living artefacts.
Warrington and McCarthy (1987) also found a distinction within the category of 
non-living artefacts, with their patient showing a deficit for small manipulable objects 
and preserved knowledge for large man-made objects. Gem stones and musical 
instruments tended to be impaired to the same extent as living things, whereas body parts 
patterned with non-living artefacts (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & 
Shallice, 1984). To account for this, Warrington and colleagues suggested that gem 
stones differ from other non-living artefacts in that they are differentiated primarily by 
visual features in much the same way that living things are. Likewise, body parts are 
differentiated based on their functional attributes as are most non-living artefacts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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However, some researchers argue that the sensory/functional hypothesis is not 
adequate to account for more fine-grained distinctions (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) 
reported in the literature including a dissociation between the processing of plants and 
animals (Farah & Wallace, 1992; Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & Humphreys,
1997).
Pre-empting this argument, Warrington and McCarthy (1987) proposed an 
extension to the sensory/functional theory that still maintained the hypothesis that 
semantic information is organized by modality-specific information. They suggested that 
in addition to a differential weighting between the number of sensory features (visual, 
auditory, and sensorimotor features) in a category, there can also be a more fine-grained 
differentiation within modalities of knowledge. For instance, within the visual modality, 
knowledge of any object may consist of colour, shape, location, and motion. In the same 
way that different types of objects will have different weightings of features between 
modalities, different objects may have different weightings of colour, shape, location, and 
motion features. Thus, the process of differentiating between an apple and an orange may 
be more dependent on colour than the process of differentiating between species of 
animal, even though both distinctions are heavily reliant on visual features.
Each of these different types of visual features has been shown to be separable 
physiologically, anatomically, and psychologically (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). 
Therefore, damage to one of these systems with the sparing of the others may lead to 
more fine-grained categorical deficits. It follows from this argument that these types of 
categorical deficit would be less likely to occur because of the anatomical proximity of 
the systems responsible for processing different features within a single modality. Hence,
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although these fine-grained deficits are possible they are less likely to occur than deficits 
to those categories of knowledge that differ in the weightings of features between 
modalities, such as the dissociation that occurs between living and non-living things.
Warrington and McCarthy (1987) proposed a further parsing of the semantic 
system based on the finding that deficits are consistent within modalities, but not across 
modalities. Because there were differences in consistency between modalities, they 
concluded that semantic knowledge is not only separated into sensory and functional 
stores, but also into independent stores based on the input modality. Therefore, there may 
be a sensory semantic store for visual objects and a sensory store for verbal input.
Because there are separate sensory stores for both visual and auditory inputs there may be 
duplication of information within the semantic system. For instance, the fact that tigers 
have stripes may be represented in the visual input store as well as the auditory input 
store. This more fine-grained specialization of knowledge within the semantic system 
would lead to a quasi-categorically organized knowledge base for each modality of input. 
In fact, as Caramazza and Shelton (1998) point out, the more fine-grained the 
sensory/functional hypothesis becomes, the closer it is to being functionally identical to a 
purely categorical separation of living and non-living things within the semantic system. 
As more minute sensory details are hypothesized to compose one category and not the 
other the more the system is functionally separated into semantic categories.
Based on the arguments discussed above the validity of the sensory/functional 
hypothesis is dependent on the suggestion that sensory and functional features are 
differentially represented in living things versus non-living artefacts. Although 
Warrington and Shallice (1984) made the assumption that this was the case, they
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provided no formal test of the hypothesis. Farah and McClelland (1991) devised a test to 
quantify the number of functional and visual features associated with a list of living and 
nonliving artefacts. Forty-two undergraduate students were required to read the dictionary 
definitions of living and nonliving artefacts and underline all of the occurrences of 
functional and visual features. The results showed an average of 2.68 visual features for 
all living things and 1.57 for the nonliving artefacts. For functional features, there was an 
average of .35 for the living things and 1.11 for the nonliving artefacts. The ratios of 
visual to functional features are 7.7:1 for living things and 1.4:1 for nonliving artefacts. 
Thus, the data confirmed the hypothesis that visual features are more prevalent in the 
definitions for living things than nonliving artefacts.
To further test the predictions of the sensory/functional hypothesis, Farah and 
McClelland (1991) developed a parallel distributed processing model in which semantic 
knowledge was divided into visual and functional features. In accord with the 
sensory/functional hypothesis the assumption was made that semantic knowledge is 
composed of information from these two separate but interconnected stores and that the 
ratio of visual to functional features is much larger for living than for nonliving artefacts. 
When the visual component of the semantic store was “lesioned”, the result proved to be 
a deficit for living things with the reverse dissociation occurring following lesions to the 
functional component of the semantic store. The results of this study indicate that 
category specific deficits can arise from a semantic system that is not categorically 
organized, but is instead organized by visual and functional features.
However, as Caramazza and Shelton (1998) point out, the results of the modeling 
experiment performed by Farah and McClelland (1991) are not surprising considering the
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ratio of visual to functional features was set at 16.1:2.1 for living things and 9.4:6.7 for 
nonliving artefacts. Given these ratios, it is not difficult to predict that damage to the 
visual semantic network would result in a more severe deficit for living than for 
nonliving things. Thus, the finding of major importance in the study conducted by Farah 
and McClelland (1991) is the discrepancy in the ratios of visual and functional features 
between living and nonliving artefacts.
Even this finding has been refuted, however (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Tyler, 
Moss, Durrant-Peatfield, & Levy, 2000). Caramazza and Shelton (1998) argued that 
Farah and McClelland encouraged their participants to exclude functional properties of 
living things by the instructions that were given. The participants examining definitions 
of words for functional features were instructed to consider only what the item “is for”, 
which is principally a property of artefacts. Potentially, the participants could have found 
many more nonsensory features of living things such as, ferocious, carnivore, omnivore, 
etc., had the instructions been altered. Thus, the differences in the ratios of sensory to 
nonsensory information for living and nonliving things could have been much smaller.
To test this, Caramazza and Shelton (1998) instructed two groups of participants 
to underline either all sensory features or all nonsensory features in the definitions of the 
living and nonliving artefacts used by Farah and McClelland. They found that the ratios 
of sensory to nonsensory features for living things and nonliving artefacts to be 2.9:2.5 
and 2.2:2.3, respectively. These results are difficult for the sensory/functional hypothesis 
to accommodate and call into question the hypothesis that living things are defined by 
more sensory than nonsensory features.
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Humphreys and Riddoch (1999) found results that they interpreted as supporting 
the hypothesis that non-living artefacts are better represented by functional definitions 
than sensory definitions. They examined the ability of a learning disabled child to learn 
lists of non-living artefacts under two different presentation conditions. In one condition 
the child was presented with the target object and another relational object. These were 
accompanied by a statement that related the objects spatially. For example, she was 
shown a picture of a glass and a table and was told, “this is a glass and you find it on a 
table.” This condition was believed to encourage the child to process sensorial features. 
In the other condition the child was shown a picture of the object, which was 
accompanied by the experimenter miming the action that is typically associated with 
using the object. If the object was a glass, for example, the experimenter would mime 
taking a drink from the glass. Following each trial the child was required to repeat the 
name of the object before moving on to the next trial. Subsequently, she was presented 
with all of the pictures from the lists and asked to give the name of the object and her 
performance was better for words learned in the actions condition than in the spatial 
condition. Humphries and Riddoch viewed these results as support for the 
sensory/functional hypothesis.
Variable and vague usage of the term “functional” has been another criticism of 
the sensory/functional hypothesis. Functional knowledge of an object has been 
interpreted as how one would act on an object as well as how the object itself operates. 
An example of the former interpretation is how one swings a hammer to hit a nail; an 
example of the latter is how a horse pulls a carriage. It has also been interpreted as purely 
motor knowledge for manipulating an object. Importantly, if not defined as motor
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knowledge, “functional” knowledge must be based in sensory or verbal knowledge or 
some combination of the three (sensory, verbal, and motor), since these are the only 
forms of knowledge possible. The concept of “sensory knowledge” has also been used 
somewhat ambiguously in the literature with some researchers referring specifically to 
visual knowledge and others meaning all forms of sensory knowledge.
Processing of Perceptual and Functional Features in Patients with Categorical Deficits
The literature investigating whether patients with deficits for living things have 
deficits for the sensory features of all items offers conflicting results. Although a number 
of studies appear to confirm this prediction, others have not. Basso et al. (1988) were 
among the first to test for the presence of a sensory modality-specific deficit in a patient 
with a deficit for living things. They reported that the patient answered 25 out of 29 
questions regarding the functional features of living things correctly. By contrast, the 
same patient responded correctly to only 10 out of 20 questions regarding the sensory 
features of living items.
Silveri and Gainotti (1988) reported results similar to Basso et al’s (1988) from 
their examination of a patient with a deficit for living things. The patient was able to 
name 1 out of 11 animals correctly from definitions that were based primarily on visual 
descriptions, but was able to name 8 of 14 correctly from definitions that stressed the 
functional features of the animals. Similarly, De Renzi & Lucchelli (1994) reported that 
their subject could answer questions about the functional attributes of living things, but 
was unable to answer questions relating to their sensory features. This dissociation 
between functional and sensory attributes, however, was not found for non-living 
artefacts.
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Although these results appear to support the predictions of the sensory/functional 
hypothesis, Caramazza and Shelton (1998) argue that these studies should be viewed with 
caution because of the presence of uncontrolled confounds. Specifically, the above 
studies failed to control for the relative difficulty of questions about sensory and 
functional features. For instance, in the study by Silveri and Gainotti (1988) the patient 
was tested on the functional attributes of domesticated animals and the visual attributes of 
wild animals, which may well differ in difficulty level. Also, research has shown that 
judgments regarding the visual features of items are more difficult than questions about 
the functional features (Stewart, Parkin, & Hunkin, 1992). Stewart et al. reported that the 
dissociation between visual and functional features disappeared when the difficulty of 
items was controlled for in a patient with a category-specific deficit for living things. 
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) state that it has yet to be shown that there is a discrepancy 
between the processing of visual and functional features in a patient with a category- 
specific deficit for living things.
Keeping these potential confounds in mind, Gainotti and Silveri (1996) retested 
their patient with a category-specific deficit for living things. They controlled for the 
effects of word frequency and stimulus familiarity, examined whether the dissociation 
between the patient’s ability to identify visual and functional features was an artefact of 
stimulus selection, and tested whether the patient’s deficit was limited to visual features, 
or included other sensory features as well. The patient again presented with deficits for 
animals, plants and flowers, food, and musical instruments, with a relative preservation of 
knowledge for non-living objects and body parts. This effect was observed when the 
words were matched for frequency and when they were not. Also, although familiarity of
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the items accounted for a large portion of the variance the difference between the 
categories persisted after it was controlled.
The most important experiment of Gainotti and Silveri’s (1996) study for the 
present discussion tested for deficits for visual-perceptual information and for functional- 
encyclopedic information. To control for any stimulus frequency or familiarity effects 
two descriptions of each item were presented to the patient. One of the descriptions was 
based on visual features and the other was based on functional features. The patient was 
required to name the item based on the descriptions given. For example, for the word 
“horse” the functional description was “domestic animal that neighs, trots, and gallops” 
and the visual description was “domestic animal with a flowing mane and tail.” To select 
items for which both the functional and visual descriptions were unambiguous and 
relatively easy, 150 sentences were given in random order to 5 independent judges 
matched to the patient in age and education. The patient had a greater impairment for 
identifying the animals from their visual descriptions than from their functional 
descriptions (6% and 43% correct, respectively). By contrast, both the visual and the 
functional descriptions of non-living artefacts resulted in identical performance of 58 
percent correct. However, these results are somewhat compromised by the finding that 
the control subjects also performed slightly better when identifying animals from their 
functional descriptions than from their visual descriptions (95% and 82% correct, 
respectively).
In contrast to the results reported by Gainotti and Silveri (1996), Laiacona et al. 
(1997) described two patients with category-specific deficits for living things that showed 
equal impairment on visual and functional features of items. When these two patients
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were tested on a forced-choice task with questions about visual or functional features that 
were matched for difficulty, there was no difference between performance on visual and 
functional questions for living things (73% and 69% correct, respectively for one patient; 
55% and 58% correct, respectively for the other) or nonliving artefacts (96% correct for 
both visual and functional features for one patient; 91% and 84% correct for the other). 
Similarly, Funnell and De Momay Davies (1997) found that the patient previously 
examined by Warrington and Shallice (1984) had an equal amount of impairment for the 
visual and the functional features of a list of living things.
Consistent with these findings, Caramazza and Shelton (1998) had their patient 
respond “true” or “false” to an attribute statement about an object. The patient had an 
impaired ability to make judgments about the attributes of animals and food items 
regardless of whether the statement related to visual or functional features. This was 
contrasted to her performance on the questions about non-living artefacts, which was 
within normal limits for both visual and functional features. The impairment with which 
this patient presented did not appear to be specific to visual knowledge as hypothesized 
by the sensory/functional hypothesis.
As a further test of the predictions of the sensory/functional hypothesis,
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) had their patient view a set of pictures and determine 
whether each one was a real animal or a real artefact. Half of the pictures represented a 
real item with the other half being a combination of two different items. For example, one 
false animal picture was a bear with a horse’s head and a false artefact was a hammer 
with the handle of a screw-driver. The patient had difficulty determining which pictures 
represented real animals, with a tendency to respond “yes” (70% hit rate and 50% correct
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rejection). On the other hand, the patient had little difficulty distinguishing real from 
unreal artefacts (similar results were reported by Kolinsky et al., 2002). In another task, 
the patient was required to select which of two heads went with a headless body, or which 
of two parts went with a non-living artefact that was missing something. Again, the 
patient was severely impaired at selecting the correct animal head, but had no trouble 
identifying the correct part for the artefact.
Two conclusions can be reached from the above results. Firstly, performance on 
the real and unreal pictures task rules out the possibility that the patient’s impairment was 
simply a name retrieval deficit. Secondly, it is difficult for the sensory/functional 
hypothesis to account for the finding that the patient’s visual knowledge for living things 
was impaired, but his visual knowledge for non-living artefacts was intact. If patients 
with deficits for living things have a specific impairment for the processing of 
visual/sensory features of items then one would predict that their knowledge for the 
visual features of both animals and artefacts would be impaired, while their knowledge 
for the functional features of both animals and artefacts would be spared. The present 
results, however, indicate impaired knowledge for the visual and functional attributes of 
animals with spared visual and functional knowledge of non-living artefacts.
Kolinsky et al. (2002) also showed that a patient with a category-specific deficit 
for living things had impaired knowledge for the structural attributes of living things but 
not non-living artefacts. Their patient displayed poor memory drawing and drawing 
completion of living things despite an intact ability to copy the figures. Furthermore, they 
observed a significant impairment in the patient’s colour knowledge for living things. For 
example, in one of the tasks the patient was required to select the correctly coloured
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object from a set of four. Although he performed within the average range on pictures of 
non-living artefacts his performance on pictures of animals was very poor (71% correct 
and 5% correct, respectively). This was the case even on items that he recognized (e.g. he 
selected the red mouse, yet he correctly named and described it).
The sensory/functional hypothesis has difficulty accounting for the results of 
studies presenting patients with deficits for both the sensory and functional features of 
living things with a sparing of knowledge for the sensory and functional features of non­
living artefacts. However, Humpreys and Forde (2001) pointed out that there are flaws in 
both the methodology used and the conclusions reached by the researchers reporting 
these results.
Firstly, as mentioned previously the term “functional features” is not well defined 
with variability in its use arising not only between studies, but also within them. The most 
problematic methodological error is a difference in the definition used for functional 
features for living and non-living artefacts. Functional knowledge for nonliving things 
has generally referred to how the item is used, which is in many cases dependent on the 
motor activity involved in its usage. Functional knowledge for living things, on the other 
hand, has included the behaviour of the organism, the environment in which certain 
plants and animals are found, and even the sounds that animals make.
In addition to the methodological problems associated with the definition of 
functional features the conclusions reached by those who have found deficits for both 
sensory and functional features of living things are flawed. Humphreys and Forde (2001) 
argue that hypotheses that stress the differential damage of types of knowledge (such as 
the sensory/functional hypothesis) can account for category-specific deficits that include
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all types of information (i.e. deficits for both sensory and functional knowledge for living 
things). If patients represent living things primarily in terms of visual/sensory 
information, then damage to this visual/sensory store may render the knowledge for any 
particular living thing inaccessible. Thus, the patients may not be able to access enough 
information to distinguish one member of a living category from another. For instance, if 
a patient does not know that a camel has two humps, or is brown, or has four legs, then 
that patient does not really know what a camel is and will not be able to answer typical 
“functional” questions such as “Does a camel live in the desert.” It is possible that in 
order to answer any questions about living things, one must first access a visual 
representation of that living thing.
The hypothesis that accessing any information about living things is highly 
dependent on first accessing a visual representation of that item has been supported by a 
number of neuro-imaging studies which showed that areas of the brain responsible for 
processing form were activated when participants answered questions about visual 
features and functional features of living things (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; 
Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1999). Thus, one’s ability to “know” 
what a living thing is and answer questions both about what it looks like and how it 
functions appears to be dependent on one’s ability to access the visual features of the 
item. This is contrasted with the finding that the same area of the brain responsible for the 
processing of form features is not activated when participants are retrieving functional 
information about non-living items. These neuro-imaging data are consistent with an 
explanation for category-specific deficits for both sensory and functional knowledge of 
living things that is in keeping with the sensory/functional hypothesis.
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In summary, a great deal of research activity has been devoted to falsifying the 
sensory/functional model. The model has been defended from these attacks by claims of 
methodological problems associated with the definition of functional knowledge in living 
things and non-living artefacts. However, the sensory/functional hypothesis has more 
difficulty accounting for patients with deficits for living things who have difficulty 
performing object decision tasks with living things, but not with non-living artefacts. If 
there is damage to visual information processing systems such damage should also impair 
the visual processing of non-living artefacts. This inconsistency is addressed in the HIT 
model, the visual crowding hypothesis, and in the model being proposed in this paper, 
each of which will be discussed later in the introduction.
Categorical Hypothesis 
The categorical hypotheses states that living things and non-living artefacts are 
represented in separate stores within semantic memory. For instance, Caramazza and 
Shelton (1998) proposed that separate stores for living and non-living things have 
developed as a result of evolutionary pressures. Initially, evolutionary pressures would 
have encouraged the development of neurological structures devoted to living things. 
More specifically, neurological structures would have developed to represent animals 
because they are important for food and as potential predators. Separate structures would 
have developed to represent plant-life also as a source of food and for medicinal 
purposes. Non-living artefacts would not be of such importance until later in human 
evolution when tool usage developed. The evolutionary gains that accompanied an ability 
to distinguish between living and non-living things led to the development of distinct
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neurological structures which now form the organizational basis for conceptual 
knowledge.
Proponents of the categorical hypothesis argue that the idea that conceptual 
knowledge is organized into these three basic categories can account for some of the 
research findings that cannot be easily accommodated within a sensory/functional 
framework. For instance, a number of studies described above have reported that patients 
with category-specific deficits have an equal impairment for their knowledge of the 
functional and sensorial attributes of living things. This is accompanied by an intact 
knowledge for both the sensorial and the functional attributes of nonliving things 
(Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Funnell & De Momay Davies, 1997; Laiacona et al.
1997). Of course, the sensory/functional hypothesis makes the prediction that if a patient 
has a deficit for living things they should have a deficit for the sensorial attributes of both 
living and nonliving items but intact functional knowledge for both. The categorical 
hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that categorical deficits should be associated with 
deficient knowledge for both sensorial and functional features of the affected category, 
with intact sensory and functional knowledge for the unaffected category.
The categorical hypothesis can also account for the reports involving some of the 
finer-grained dissociations that have been found in patients with category-specific 
impairments. For instance, although a number of patients have been found to have 
deficits for both plants and animals, some studies have reported on patients presenting 
with deficits for one but not the other (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Farah & Wallace, 
1992; Forde et al. 1997). If knowledge of plants and animals was maintained by 
functionally separate systems, results such as these would be expected to occur.
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The sensory/functional hypothesis explains such deficits as occurring because of 
different types o f sensory knowledge being more important for certain items (Warrington 
& McCarthy, 1987). For example, intact colour knowledge may be of greater importance 
for distinguishing between different types of plants and fruits, whereas shape may be of 
greater importance for differentiating between different animals. Therefore, loss of either 
colour or shape knowledge will differentially affect these two categories.
One problem with this explanation, however, is that differential weightings of 
colour and shape features between categories is currently only assumed and has yet to be 
empirically validated or quantified. A second problem with this explanation is similar to 
the problem with the broader differentiation of sensory and functional features. Category- 
specific deficits for plants or animals have not been shown to be consistently associated 
with deficient colour knowledge. For instance, as described earlier Kolinsky et al. (2002) 
presented a patient with a category-specific deficit for living things. This patient was 
unable to select correctly coloured animals, but performed within the average range when 
required to select the correctly coloured non-living artefact. If this patient’s deficit for 
animals was related to deficient colour knowledge, he would not have been able to select 
the correctly coloured non-living artefacts.
Although many proponents of the categorical hypothesis state that this theory 
offers a better explanation of the more fine-grained dissociations that occur, there are 
some patterns that do not fit with the predictions of the theory. The categorical hypothesis 
provides no explanation for the patterns of deficits reported by Warrington and McCarthy
(1987) which led to the development of the sensory/functional hypothesis. Although this 
patient had deficits for nonliving things, a more fine-grained examination of the deficits
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revealed difficulties with small manipulable objects and body parts, but preserved 
knowledge for large man-made objects, gem stones, and musical instruments. This 
pattern of impairments is difficult to explain in terms of the categorical hypothesis, but is 
actually predicted by the sensory/functional hypothesis.
Much of the research supporting the argument that living and nonliving things are 
represented in functionally distinct areas of the brain comes from developmental studies 
and research involving semantic knowledge in children. S. Gelman (1988), for example, 
reported that four-year-olds could state whether something was made by people, thus 
indicating that they had the ability to identify man-made artefacts.
Other studies have shown that preschoolers have an understanding of the basic 
differences between living and non-living things. R. Gelman (1990) asked a group of 
preschool children to describe what was on the inside and outside of both living and non­
living things. The children described the inside of living things in different ways than 
they described the outside. The inside of non-living things, on the other hand, was 
described in the same way as the outside. Gelman argued that children had learned at an 
early age about the biological structure of a particular living thing and had generalized to 
other living things without crossing the boundary between living and non-living things. 
From this Gelman argued that knowledge of living and non-living things was domain- 
specific and based on a contrasting set of principles.
Massey and R. Gelman (1988) conducted a similar study on the three- and four- 
year-olds’ knowledge of living and non-living things. The children were presented with 
novel pictures of mammals, non-mammalian animals, rigid complex artefacts, wheeled 
objects, and statues composed of animal-like parts, and asked to determine which of the
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items was capable of going up a hill unassisted. The children selected both the mammals 
and non-mammals, rejecting all other categories including the statues with animal-like 
parts. This indicates that the children had the ability to identify those visual-perceptual 
characteristics that were reflective of things capable of self-initiated movement. R. 
Gelman (1990) later concluded that this ability to distinguish between items that can and 
cannot move on their own was the basis of the conceptual distinction between animate 
and inanimate objects.
Other researchers have investigated this ability to differentiate animate from 
inanimate objects at an even younger age. Mandler, Bauer, and McDonough (1991) 
examined the ability of 18-month-old infants to make even more fine-grained 
distinctions, separating animals, plants, and non-living items. The infants were able to 
make these distinctions as well as distinctions within the categories, such as separating 
furniture from kitchen utensils. These results led the authors to hypothesize that the 
infants were grouping items not based on visual similarities, but were relying instead on 
the movement patterns and the origin of the movement associated with each category. 
This hypothesis has implications for the dissociations that occur in category-specific 
deficits, possibly illustrating a mechanism by which evolution could select for the 
functional separation of the representations of living and non-living things. Furthermore, 
elements of the sensory/functional hypothesis are also incorporated. If infants are selected 
to distinguish and group objects based on the sensory feature of movement patterns, then 
this would provide a mechanism by which the representations of animate and inanimate 
objects are functionally separated within the semantic system.
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Caramzza and Shelton (1998) elaborated on their proposal that semantic 
information is organized categorically in The Organized Unitary Content Hypothesis 
(OUCH). In OUCH the idea of modality specific semantic organization and the notion 
that category-specific deficits arise from differential weightings of sensorial and non- 
sensorial features between categories is rejected. In OUCH, although there are no 
categorical boundaries within the semantic system, a categorical structure emerges 
because of clustering of like features within a category.
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) elaborate on two fundamental characteristics of 
categories on which the OUCH is based. First of all, the properties of an object are highly 
intercorrelated. Second, members of a superordinate category share a number of features 
in common. Thus, a certain group of animals is going to consist of particular shapes, 
textures, colours, and scents, whereas a non-living artefact is going to have different 
types of features. In other words, certain properties tend to occur with one another or are 
intercorrelated. In addition, these intercorrelated features are going to be differentially 
distributed in the categories of living and nonliving things. Therefore, the 
multidimensional space of semantic features is not organized homogeneously, but instead 
consists of some regions that are densely packed and others that are more diffuse 
(lumpy). The dense regions consist of features that are highly correlated and are likely to 
represent concepts relating to living things. This is because living items tend to have 
more highly correlated features than do nonliving things.
From this hypothesized inhomogeneous organization of the semantic system it 
follows that focal damage is likely to result in category-specific deficits. Furthermore, 
those semantic categories that contain highly correlated features (living things) are
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densely packed and more likely to be damaged than those categories with less correlated 
features. The other prediction arising from this theory is that various patterns of category- 
specific deficits can occur as a result of the differences in the patterns of brain damage 
from case to case. Because the semantic system is hypothesized to be unitary but lumpy, 
the exact pattern of deficits will depend on the exact areas of the brain that have been 
damaged. Therefore, although it is more likely that a patient will present with a category- 
specific deficit for living things because the features of this category are densely packed, 
in the OUCH the possibility that a patient may present with a deficit for large non-living 
objects and gem-stones in addition to living things is allowed.
Another major prediction made by OUCH is that category-specific deficits should 
not be associated with a disproportionate deficit for visual over functional attributes.
This is because focal damage to the semantic system should affect highly correlated 
features regardless of whether those features are visual or functional. This prediction 
clearly distinguishes the OUCH hypothesis from the sensory/functional hypothesis which 
predicts a discrepancy in the knowledge for sensory versus functional features.
The discrepancy between the processing of perceptual and functional features in 
living and non-living things was discussed in the previous section. There is evidence that 
patients with deficits for living things have greater difficulty processing the visual 
attributes of this category compared to their ability to process the visual attributes of non­
living artefacts (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Kolinsky et al., 2002).
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Alzheimer’s Disease and the Intercorrelations Hypothesis 
Alzheimer’s Disease and Category-Specific Deficits
Recently, many of the hypotheses about the representation and storage of 
categorical knowledge has also been examined in patients with Alzheimer’s Disease 
(AD) that present with category-specific deficits. The fact that a number of researchers 
previously believed that category-specific deficits were the result of localized lesions and 
AD resulted in damage that was more diffuse led to the AD population being largely 
ignored until recently (Gonnerman et al. 1997).
However, Silveri et al. (1991) hypothesized that because AD patients present 
initially with damage to temporolimbic structures they would be likely to experience such 
impairments, much like HSE patients. As predicted, AD patients demonstrated a pattern 
of impairment similar to that of HSE patients, showing greater impairments for living 
things than for non-living things. Based on these results and those from earlier studies of 
stroke patients the authors hypothesized that damage to temporolimbic structures results 
in a selective semantic impairment for living things, and damage to frontoparietal areas 
results in a category-specific impairment for non-living artefacts.
A later paper by Guistolisi, Bartolomeo, Daniele, Marra, and Gainotti (1993) 
reported similar results to those of Silveri et al. (1991) for patients in the early stages of 
the disease. When the patients were tested six months later, two of three no longer 
showed an effect of category. As one would expect, this was not the result of an 
improvement in their performance with living things, but a deterioration in their 
performance with non-living artefacts. The authors concluded that as the disease 
progresses the damage becomes so pervasive that deficits become apparent in all forms of
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knowledge. This illustrates one of the difficulties with studies involving AD patients: the 
pattern of deficits is extremely heterogeneous, meaning that much larger sample sizes are 
necessary than those used in the above studies in order to make any conclusions about the 
group as a whole.
The finding that AD patients present with category-specific deficits suggested to 
some researchers the possibility that they can emerge as a result of non-selective damage 
to a unitary semantic system. This depends, however, on the assumption that concepts are 
represented as different patterns of activation over multiple semantic features. It is the 
patterns of connections that differentiate one category from another with some categories 
being represented by more or fewer connections than others. Random damage to 
connections will then result in a pattern of deficits that appears to be category-specific. 
The Intercorrelations Hypotheses
The idea that category-specific deficits can arise from diffuse damage to a 
connectionist system has received some empirical support from studies of patients with 
AD and from patients with other forms of pathology. Moss and Tyler (1997,2000) 
examined a patient with generalized cerebral atrophy who presented with a 
disproportionate deficit for non-living artefacts that became more pronounced as her 
condition worsened. Likewise, Tyler et al. (2000) reported the same pattern of deficits in 
a patient with generalized cerebral atrophy, thus indicating that focal lesions are not 
necessary for the development of category-specific semantic impairments.
Gonnerman et al. (1997) tested a group of 15 patients with probable AD in the 
mild to moderate stages. In contrast to the results reported by Silveri et al. (1991), as a 
group the patients did not show greater impairment in their knowledge for living things
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than for non-living things. Based on the discrepant findings of the two studies and the 
argument that the neuropathology present in AD is actually less localized than Silveri et 
al. suggested, Gonnerman et al. rejected the hypothesis that patients with AD present with 
category-specific deficits for living things because of damage to temporolimbic 
structures.
However, closer inspection of the data of individual subjects revealed that one of 
the patients had a category-specific deficit for living things and another had a selective 
deficit for non-living things. Furthermore, in contrast to the findings reported by Silveri et 
al., data from these two patients revealed that these category-specific deficits remained 
fairly stable over the course of two to four years. Although the authors acknowledged that 
the results could be explained simply by assuming that the patient with deficits for living 
things had damage to temporolimbic structures and the patient with deficits for non-living 
things had frontoparietal damage, they stated that neither MRI scans nor 
neuropsychological testing supported this hypothesis.
In a second experiment involving 15 patients with mild to moderate AD 
Gonnerman et al. (1997) found that those patients who were less impaired tended to show 
slight deficits for non-living artefacts, whereas those who were more severely impaired 
tended to have a greater deficit for living things. Although this trend was not statistically 
verified it motivated the development of a theory to explain the pattern of deficits in AD 
patients. In this theory, living things are less affected by small amounts of generalized 
brain atrophy than non-living things because living things tend to have a greater number 
of intercorrelated features than non-living things. Intercorrelated features are those 
features that occur together for multiple items within a semantic category. For instance,
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“has fur” and “has teeth” are features that occur together for a number of different 
animals and are therefore considered intercorrelated features. Moreover, according to this 
view, those features that distinguish one item in a category from another item are 
different for living and non-living things. Similar to the sensory/functional hypothesis 
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) and the visual crowding hypothesis (Humpreys and 
Riddoch, 1987; described in the following section) Gonnerman et al. suggest that 
distinguishing features tend to be sensorial for living things and functional for non-living 
things.
Thus, the main tenets of the theory are that living things tend to have a higher 
ratio of sensory to functional features than non-living things; living things have a greater 
number of intercorrelations between features than non-living things; and those features 
that distinguish one living thing from another tend to be sensorial, while functional 
features distinguish non-living things from one another. The effect of the numerous 
intercorrelations among living things will be protective when the damage is minimal 
because the information from individual features is supported by the intercorrelations 
with other features. However, as the disease progresses and more connections are lost a 
critical point will be reached when the remaining connections can no longer compensate 
for the loss and activation of the remaining features will no longer reach the threshold of 
comprehension. Once this stage is reached all of those items that relied on the 
connections among a damaged set of features are left unavailable. Similar to the 
categorical hypothesis (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998) this theory allows for a unitary 
semantic system.
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A similar theory has been proposed by McRae and Seidenberg (1997). McRae and 
Seidenberg had normal participants generate lists of the important features of exemplars 
from living items and non-living artefacts. The results indicated that living items tend to 
have more intercorrelated features than non-living items. This is protective for living 
items when there is a small amount of damage, but results in the loss of entire categories 
with larger amounts of damage. As an illustration of this process imagine the features 
“has four legs”, “has fur”, “has teeth”, and “has claws”. These features are all 
intercorrelated and represent a large number of mammals. If the connections between one 
of the features is damaged the remaining connections will be able to compensate, thereby 
allowing comprehension of all of the mammals that are represented by these features. 
However, once a critical point is reached all of those mammals that are represented by the 
features will no longer be available in semantic memory. The result of this process is a 
non-linear deterioration in the representations of living things as AD progresses.
This pattern of deficits is contrasted by those that occur for non-living artefacts. 
Because there are fewer intercorrelations between the features of non-living artefacts, 
there is a very limited ability of intact connections to compensate for damaged ones. This 
results in a slight deficit for artefacts even in the earlier stages of disease progression. As 
the disease progresses there will be a loss of knowledge of individual items across 
categories of artefacts. However, because there are relatively few intercorrelations among 
artefacts whole categories are not lost at advanced stages of the disease. Thus, the 
presentation of deficits for artefacts will proceed linearly with disease progression, in 
contrast to the pattern of deficits for living things.
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Although the theory proposed by Gonnerman et al. (1997) seems to hold some 
explanatory power for the results of a number of the patients examined in their study, the 
results from the AD population as a whole are far from clear. In fact, a number of the 
patients studied by Gonnerman et al. (1997) did not fit the predicted pattern, with four 
showing greater non-living artefacts deficits than would be predicted. The authors 
suggest the possibility that in some cases damage that is more focal in nature may occur 
by chance resulting in patterns of deficits that do not fit with predictions.
As mentioned previously the results of Silveri et al. (1991) are at odds with those 
of Gonnerman et al. Silveri et al. reported that their subjects with moderate AD showed 
an overall deficit for living things, whereas the patients in Gonnerman et al.’s study did 
not. Giustolisi et al. (1993) reported results that were similar on initial testing to those 
reported by Silveri et al., with the group of AD patients showing an overall deficit for 
living things. They also reported that when the patients were examined six months later 
the category-specific deficit for living things disappeared. The authors argued that AD 
patients present initially with deficits for living things, but at later stages of the disease 
process damage becomes so pervasive that the category effect is lost. This pattern of 
results conflicts with the predictions of Gonnerman et al. (1997), who state that there 
should be an initial deficit for non-living things followed by a deficit for living things as 
the disease progresses.
Garrard, Patterson, Watson, and Hodges (1998) reported results that were similar 
to those of Silver et al. (1991) and Guistolisi et al. (1993), with their patients showing an 
overall deficit for living things. Garrard et al. also questioned whether intercorrelations 
between features would provide protection from decay. They disagree with Gonnerman et
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
al. (1997) who state that the majority of patients with degenerative diseases present with 
neural pathology that is more diffuse than focal. Garrard et al. state that in the majority of 
cases patients will present with category-specific deficits for living things that are 
associated with an initial involvement of the transentorhinal cortex and the temporal 
neocortex. A minority of patients will show deficits for non-living things that is related to 
damage of bi-parietal regions. The authors incorporate the hypotheses developed in the 
sensory/functional hypothesis, stating that the double dissociation that occurs between the 
two groups of patients reflects the storage of perceptual features in the temporal lobes and 
the storage of functional features in the fronto-parietal regions.
Whatmough et al. (2003) also found an overall deficit for biological things in a 
group of 72 AD patients. To examine the relationship between the severity of the 
semantic deficit and the strength of the category effect the authors grouped the patients 
based on their scores on a picture naming task (the Categorical Picture Naming Task 
(CPNT) developed by Chertkow, Murtha, Frederickson, and Whitehead, 1999). Those 
patients that performed at the highest level on the CPNT did not show any category- 
specific deficit for living things. As the level of semantic impairment increased, however, 
so did the degree of separation between performance with living things and non-living 
artefacts, up to a category difference of 20% for those patients who were most severely 
impaired. In fact, 68 of the 72 AD patients presented with the categorical deficit for living 
things and only two presented with the opposite pattern of deficits. These results are not 
consistent with the intercorrelational model proposed by Gonnerman et al. (1997).
The potential for random damage in a unitary semantic system to create category- 
specific deficits has also been examined by lesioning distributed connectionist models.
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Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, and Seidenberg (1998) were concerned with how such a 
model could account for category-specific deficits that occurred as a result of the random, 
patchy damage that is found in patients with AD. Similar to the model developed *by 
Farah and McClelland (1991) concepts were represented as vectors distributed over 
perceptual and functional semantic features and living things were represented with a 
higher proportion of perceptual features than non-living things. These implementations 
also accounted for those characteristics described by Gonnerman et al. (1997) such as the 
differential representation of distinctive features between the categories, with living 
things having more shared features and fewer distinctive features than non-living things. 
The living things category was also given more strongly correlated features than non­
living things as was demonstrated by McRae, de Sa, and Seidenberg (1997).
Similar to the pattern of results reported by Gonnerman et al. (1997) mild 
nonselective damage to the model caused a category-specific deficit for non-living things 
because there were fewer correlated features to compensate for the loss than there was for 
living things. With more severe lesions, however, whole categories of living things were 
lost resulting in a greater deficit for living things. This model predicts that with mild 
nonselective damage there will be a deficit for non-living things that will progress to a 
deficit for living things as damage becomes more extensive. However, the study by 
Gonnerman et al. (1997) is the only one to report anything that resembles this pattern of 
deficits in a patient population.
In a more recent investigation of the deficits associated with AD, Zannino, Perri, 
Carlesimo, Pasqualetti, and Caltagirone (2001) attempted to determine whether a true 
category-specific deficit exists for this population and whether the pattern of deficit was
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related to the overall severity of the impairment. This study improved upon previous ones 
by controlling confounding variables such as frequency, prototypicality, visual 
complexity, age of acquisition, and name and image agreement. The results showed an 
overall category-specific deficit for living things similar to those reported in previous 
studies (Garrard et al., 1998; Guistolisi et al., 1993; & Sliveri et al., 1991) and contrasted 
with the results reported by Gonnerman et al. (1997). Furthermore, although Gonnerman 
et al. hypothesized that AD patients may present with deficits for non-living things early 
in the disease process, Zannino et al. (2001) failed to find a single subject out of a total of 
fifty-three that presented with this pattern of deficits.
The relationship between disease progression and severity of category-specific 
deficit was also examined. The results reported differed from all other reports of this 
relationship. Gonnerman et al. (1997) reportedly found deficits for non-living artefacts 
early in the disease process followed by a switch to a more severe deficit for living things 
later in the progression of AD. In contrast, Guistolisi et al. (1993) reported an initial 
category-specific deficit for living things that later disappeared as performance with non­
living artefacts also deteriorated. Zannino et al. (2001) reported that the initial category- 
specific deficit for living things was mild and actually became more pronounced in the 
latter stages of the disease.
Tyler et al. (2000) proposed a connectionist model similar to that of Gonnerman 
et al. (1997) hypothesizing that diffuse damage, as opposed to focal damage, was 
responsible for category-specific deficits for living things. This theory also allows for the 
possibility of a unitary semantic system that is not separated into different components 
for different types of semantic information. Central to this model is the hypothesis that
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functional features of concepts are of particular importance and are more resilient to brain 
damage than sensorial features. Furthermore, functional features play a different role in 
the representations of living and non-living things. For non-living things the function of 
an item is of utmost importance to the conceptual representation and is clearly associated 
with the physical form of the item. For instance, the shape of a shovel is strongly 
connected to its function and it is this function that differentiates it from other items.
From this, Tyler et al. (2000) suggest that it is functional information that differentiates 
one non-living item from another.
Although previous theories have suggested that functional features are relatively 
limited for living things, Tyler et al. (2000) disagree. They propose that functional 
information (albeit a different type of functional information) is very important to the 
representation of living things. This was supported from property generation norms in 
which subjects listed the features for non-living artefacts and living things. A feature was 
scored as perceptual if it could be processed by the senses and functional if it indicated 
how the item interacted with the environment. Using this procedure and the revised 
definition for functional features subjects actually reported more functional features for 
living things than for non-living artefacts. This functional information, termed biological 
function, includes any range of activities including eating, sleeping, moving, flying, 
running, etc. In the same way that certain functional features of non-living things are 
associated with certain perceptual features, functional information about living things is 
connected to sensorial features. Thus, the function of flying is associated with the 
perceptual features of wings, walking with legs, and seeing with eyes.
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It is the connections between functional and perceptual features that are 
emphasized in this theory. Those perceptual features shared within categories of living 
things are strongly connected to shared functions. That is, those perceptual features that 
are common to most members of a category are associated with the function that most 
members of the category also possess. This is not necessarily true for distinctive 
perceptual features, which are less likely to be associated with a function. In contrast, 
non-living artefacts are composed of distinctive perceptual features that are associated 
with equally distinctive functional features. Those perceptual features that a group of 
non-living artefacts share are not likely to be associated with a function.
If one assumes that strongly connected features are more resilient to damage than 
are weakly connected features, these differences in the connections that exist between the 
features of living and non-living things have implications for the patterns of deficits 
expected following damage. Because distinctive perceptual features of non-living things 
are connected to functional features and shared perceptual features of living things are 
connected to functional features it is these features that will be most resistant to damage. 
Following non-focal lesions, distinctive features of non-living things will remain, but 
only those features that are shared among groups of living things will be preserved.
Tyler et al. (2000) created a connectionist model that incorporated the features 
discussed above to test the following predictions: 1) strongly correlated features will be 
robust against lesioning because of mutual activation compensating for degraded features, 
2) functional information for both living and non-living things will tend to be preserved 
because it is always associated with perceptual information; 3) functional information for 
living things should be more robust than for non-living artefacts because the functional
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features of living things are themselves highly intercorrelated, and 4) the preservation of 
perceptual features will depend on whether they are intercorrelated with each other and/or 
functional features. For the reasons discussed above, this should result in preserved 
distinctive information for non-living artefacts with degraded shared perceptual 
information and degraded distinctive perceptual information with intact shared perceptual 
information for living things.
The modeling data from this study supported the predictions. Random lesioning 
of both perceptual and functional feature connections produced an initial impairment for 
living things followed by impairment for non-living artefacts with more severe damage. 
At moderate levels of damage the model predicts difficulty discriminating between living 
things within a category, but preserved knowledge of shared information. For artefacts, 
on the other hand, there should be no difficulties distinguishing among items, but 
knowledge of category membership will be impaired.
Currently, there is little patient data to support the predictions of this model since 
the discrepancies in performance on tests of distinctive and shared features have not been 
examined. Since deficits for non-living artefacts and living things are predicted with 
different degrees of damage, the authors argue that the model is able to account for the 
double dissociation between living and non-living things. However, none of the studies 
on AD patients have shown a progression from deficits for living things to deficits for 
non-living artefacts at later stages of the disease.
To summarize, given the heterogeneity of the findings, the deficits that have been 
shown to occur in patients with AD could not be said to support or refute any of the 
current theories regarding category-specific deficits. The only observation that has been
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reported with some consistency is that some AD patients do present with a category- 
specific deficit for living things. Presently, the results of testing for category-specific 
deficits in patients with AD has not allowed for any solid conclusions about the 
presentation or progression of these deficits, due to the amount of variability in the 
results. Although this variability is likely an artefact of the nature of the disease itself 
(and its diagnosis), further research is necessary to clarify those experimental variables 
that are causing additional variability between different studies. In all studies of category 
specific deficits in AD, patient categorization based on disease severity and 
neuropsychological profiles may be helpful in determining the relationship between 
neuropathology and category specific deficits.
The Hierarchical Interactive Theory (HIT)
The HIT model is perhaps the most comprehensive conceptualization of object 
recognition and category-specific deficits for living and non-living artefacts. The model 
was developed from the cascade model and the concept of visually crowded categories as 
proposed by Humphreys and Riddoch (1987). The theory of visually crowded categories 
suggests that because living things such as mammals and fruits have such a high degree 
of visual similarity within categories that any impairment in visual processing is going to 
affect living things more than non-living things. Visual crowding occurs when the 
features extracted from an item are no longer sufficient to differentiate it from another 
similar item.
This phenomenon may only occur when the stimulus set being learned exceeds 
some critical number (Gale, Done, & Frank, 2001). This is observed in the living world 
with certain biological categories (birds, fish, plants, flowers) for which expertise is
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required to distinguish between members of a super-ordinate category. Even when 
discriminating within categories for which expertise is not necessarily required 
(mammals), the members are much more similar than categories of non-living artefacts. 
When brain damage occurs category-specific deficits may emerge for visually crowded 
categories as a result of some restriction on the number of features available for each item 
(Gale et al., 2001). Although this explanation can account for specific deficits for living 
things with preserved visual recognition of non-living artefacts it offers no explanation 
for the reverse pattern of deficits.
The theory involving visually crowded categories received support from a study 
by Gaffan and Heywood (1993) who trained monkeys to discriminate between pairs of 
pictures from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set. Error rates during training were 
three times higher when the monkeys were discriminating living things relative to non­
living things. A similar pattern of performance was found with human participants as 
well. The authors argued that the concept of visually crowded categories offered the best 
explanation for their results.
Humphrys, Riddoch, and Quinlan (1988) elaborated on the concept of visually 
crowded categories in their “Cascade model” of object recognition and category specific 
deficits for living things. In this model object recognition occurs over three distinct 
stages; recognition of the object’s structure, access to semantic information related to the 
object, and access to the object’s name. Information regarding the object’s structure is 
hypothesized to be separate from information regarding the object’s use and its 
association to other objects (semantic information), and from the object’s name. Semantic 
information refers to all other forms of non-perceptual knowledge. Selective damage can
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occur at any of the three stages such that a patient could have deficits for the semantic 
information regarding an object, but have intact structural knowledge.
The key to the cascade model is that activation can proceed to another stage 
before processing at the previous stage is complete. For “visually crowded” items 
activation of similar perceptual features across the category will result in semantic 
information regarding the category of an object to be derived quickly. The gains from this 
quick access are cancelled by slowed access to knowledge regarding the individual item 
due to increased competition within the category. The opposite pattern is assumed for 
structurally dissimilar objects, which will be relatively delayed on category decisions, but 
individual item identification will occur relatively quickly because of reduced perceptual 
competition among category members. Consistent with this prediction Humphreys et al.
(1988) found that normal participants named living items more slowly than non-living 
artefacts. Furthermore, category decisions have been shown to be faster for living items 
than for non-living items (Humphreys & Forde, 2001).
Humphreys and Forde (2001) expanded on the Cascade model in the Hierarchical 
Interactive Theory (HIT) in which object naming requires the transmission of information 
through a series of interactive hierarchical stages. Thus, in addition to the hierarchical, 
three-stage process described in the Cascade Model, in the HIT a re-interrogation of 
structural knowledge is proposed. Object processing occurs as a “first pass” through the 
stored structural descriptions stage and then onto partial activation of an 
associative/functional (semantic) knowledge stage. However, individual identification of 
living things requires further interrogation of perceptual knowledge to allow the target to 
be differentiated from its closest neighbours. For example, processing of an apple would
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proceed from initial visual processing to access the semantic representation of fruit along 
with the word “fruit”. This semantic information would then be fed back into the visual 
description system to distinguish among members of the category “fruit”. Thus, for living 
items this means further processing of form via connections from the semantic system 
back to the visual system.
Patients with deficits for living items are hypothesized to have mild deficits in 
perceptual knowledge which prevents successful re-entrant activation from semantic 
memory. For non-living artefacts, interrogation of action-related information is necessary 
and patients with deficits for these items may have subtle deficits in action-related 
information.
Humphreys and Forde (2001) distinguish between two types of patients with 
category specific deficits for living things. One group of patients has difficulties 
performing object decisions for the affected category as described by Caramazza and 
Shelton (1998). This group is hypothesized to have deficits affecting their ability to 
access information for living things at the structural description level in addition to any 
deficits occurring at a latter stage in processing. A second group, however, has been 
shown to have intact object decision abilities for the affected category (Laiacona et al., 
1997). Humphreys and Forde suggest that these patients do not have a deficit for the 
structural knowledge of the objects and that their deficit occurs at a later processing stage.
The HIT model is able to accommodate most, if not all, varieties of category- 
specific deficits observed clinically and the experimental findings associated with each. 
This includes all of those findings that support the sensory/functional hypothesis because 
a similar distinction is made between the importance of sensory and functional features in
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different categories of items. The advantage that the HIT account holds over the 
sensory/functional hypothesis is that the findings of Caramazza and Shelton (1998) 
involving poor object decision abilities for living things with intact object decision for 
non-living things can be explained. In the HIT model difficulties performing object 
decision tests specific to living things is predicted because such items are visually 
crowded and require re-entrant activation to distinguish among them.
Neuroanatomy of Category Specific Deficits
Each of the models discussed above makes a prediction as to what neuro- 
anatomical structures will be associated with a category-specific deficit. The 
sensory/functional hypothesis as proposed by Warrington and Shallice (1984) states that 
visual attributes are very important in constructing the semantic representation for living 
things suggesting that damage to those structures responsible for storing and processing 
visual features should be associated with this deficit. A similar prediction is made in the 
HIT account (Humphreys & Forde, 2001). Furthermore, deficits for non-living things 
should be associated with damage to those areas responsible for processing “functional” 
information.
Contrary to this prediction, those theories that emphasize the importance o f the 
intercorrelations among semantic features hypothesize that it is not necessarily the 
location of the damage that accounts for these deficits, but the extent and severity of brain 
damage that will predict a category-specific deficit for living things (Gonnerman et al., 
1997; Moss, Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, & Bunn, 1998).
Finally, the predictions of the categorical hypothesis are based on the idea that 
separate semantic stores for animals, plants, and artefacts have developed through
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evolution. Because escape and feeding responses are associated with emotional reactivity 
it is hypothesized that limbic structures are responsible for representing the semantic 
features for plants and animals. Also, damage to the structures associated with these 
representations will result in deficits for all types of information related to these 
categories as opposed to deficits for just visual or functional features.
Gainotti (2000) performed a meta-analysis of the studies reporting on patients 
with category-specific deficits and the neuro-anatomical location of damage. The 
majority of the patients presenting with a semantic deficit for living things suffered from 
HSE, head trauma, and semantic dementia, which tended to result in bilateral damage to 
the anterior portions of the temporal lobes. This was contrasted by those patients that 
presented with just a lexical deficiency for living things which was usually caused by a 
stroke resulting in damage to the infero-mesial portions of the temporal and occipital 
lobes in only the left hemisphere. Although semantic deficits for living things were 
usually associated with bilateral damage, left hemisphere involvement was predominant 
in the majority of cases.
Closer inspection of the deficit for living things revealed some general differences 
in the neuro-anatomical damage associated with deficits for plants and those found with 
deficits for animals. Etiologically, diseases that tended to produce more focal damage 
also resulted in more focal deficits. Stroke tended to be the cause of category-specific 
deficits for plants, while HSE was equally represented in patients with deficits for plants, 
plants and animals, and animals. Semantic dementia, on the other hand, only resulted in 
deficits for both plants and animals. Also of interest is the finding that bi-temporal 
damage was reported in the majority of patients with deficits for both plants and animals,
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in half of the patients with deficits for animals, and in only a quarter of patients that had 
deficits for just plants.
Gainotti (2000) further examined twenty studies that reported a more fine-grained 
analysis of the structures involved in patients with category-specific deficits. The areas 
examined in the studies included the hippocampus (H), the parahippocampal gyrus 
(PHG), the temporal pole (TP), the inferior temporal lobe (IT), the antero-lateral temporal 
areas (AL), the postero-lateral temporal cortices (PL), and the medial temporo-occipital 
areas (TO). The results appeared to confirm that the usual neuro-anatomical correlate of 
category-specific semantic impairments for living things is bi-lateral temporal lobe 
lesions with a preference for the left temporal lobe. More specifically, damage was found 
to occur in the anterior portions of the temporal lobes including TP, H, PHG, IT, and AL, 
while the PL portions were spared. All patients showed damage to the inferior temporal 
lobe (IT), although the extension and symmetry of the damage was found to vary.
As expected, patients with deficits for non-living things tended to show a different 
pattern of neuro-anatomical damage than those patients with deficits for living things. 
Semantic deficits for non-living things were associated with damage to the left ffonto- 
temporo-parietal area and were always accompanied by Broca’s, Wernicke’s, or global 
aphasia.
Broadly speaking, this neuroanatomical dissociation between deficits for living 
versus non-living things appears to reflect the separation between the ventral and dorsal 
pathways. This division is based on experiments showing that lesions of the parietal 
cortex in monkeys resulted in deficits in localizing an object with respect to a particular 
landmark, but not in the identification of the object. In contrast, lesions of the inferior
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temporal cortex resulted in an inability to recognize objects, but did not affect their ability 
to process the location of objects (Bullier, 2002). The observation of a similar 
dissociation in patient’s with known lesions led to the distinction between the “what” 
pathway referring to the ventral stream and the inferior temporal cortex and the “where” 
pathway referring to the dorsal stream and the parietal cortex (Bullier, 2002). Currently, 
theories regarding the function of the dorsal pathway have been refined, suggesting that it 
is involved in visuomotor action networks, not only processing “where” an item is, but 
also “how” it might be used (Devlin et al., 2002).
Despite damage to these broad pathways and general areas being associated with 
different types of semantic impairment there is considerable variability in the effects of 
damage to specific areas. Based on the demonstrations of variability in the neuro- 
anatomical structures involved, Gainotti (2000) argued that the search for a structure that 
is critically involved in the representation of living things may not be fruitful. The results 
did, however, implicate some regions that are important for the processing of living 
things which he interpreted as supportive of the hypothesis that deficits for living things 
result from damage to visual knowledge and deficits for non-living things occur because 
of damage to functional knowledge.
Specifically, the network including the infero-temporal cortex, the mesial 
temporo-limbic structures, and the temporal pole appear to be involved in the 
representations of living things and have been found to be associated with sensory 
information. The inferior temporal lobe has been shown to receive projections from area 
V4 and is part of the extra-striate visual processing system which is believed to play a 
role in object recognition (Goodale, Milner, Jacobson, & Carey, 1991). The entorhinal
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cortex has been shown to receive integrated input from all of the sensory modalities 
receiving projections from unimodal association areas as well as polymodal association 
areas (Jones & Powell, 1970). Finally, Damasio (1990) has hypothesized that the 
temporal pole is a higher order convergence zone acting to bind together different 
components of an items representation. Thus, the above structures can be conceived of as 
components of a system that is involved in processing, storing, and retrieving sensory 
information.
In sum, the results of the meta-analysis performed by Gainotti (2000) have 
important implications for the theoretical basis of category-specific deficits. The 
sensory/functional hypothesis and the HIT are consistent with the results of this study 
which showed that deficits for living things are in fact associated with focal damage to 
areas of the brain believed to be involved in the storage and retrieval of sensory 
information. The results of cognitive testing were also consistent with this hypothesis 
showing that those categories that were more dependent on sensory features tended to 
pattern with living things, while categories that relied more on functional features did not. 
For instance, food and musical instruments tended to be deficient in those patients with 
specific deficits for living things, whereas knowledge for body parts was still intact along 
with all artefacts.
The categorical hypothesis,with its separate semantic categories for animals, 
plants, and artefacts, has difficulty explaining this pattern of deficits. The neuro- 
anatomical results are also problematic for the intercorrelations hypothesis. This theory 
states that the dissociation between living and non-living things is dependent more on the 
severity of damage to the semantic system than on the location of focal lesions. Thus,
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because living things have a greater number of intercorrelations among features they 
should be spared with limited diffuse damage to the semantic system, but show a 
dramatic decline with more severe brain damage. These data did not support this 
hypothesis.
Research with Non-Patient Populations
Gerlach and colleagues have performed a series of experiments using neuro­
imaging techniques to examine what regions of the brain are activated during different 
types of object identification tasks in normals. For instance, Gerlach, Law, Gade, and 
Paulson (1999) examined the neural correlates of object recognition and whether these 
regions differed for living objects versus non-living artefacts. On an object decision task 
the authors reported peak activations in the fusiform gyri, the parahippocampal gyri, the 
limbic lobes, the right occipital gyrus, the right superior parietal lobe, the right inferior 
frontal gyrus, the left middle occipital gyrus, and the left inferior temporal gyrus for both 
living objects and non-living artefacts. Thus, compared to performance on a simple 
pattern discrimination task the object decision tasks activated more ventral and posterior 
parts of the brain. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the ventral stream is 
important for object identification.
The object decision tasks did not activate left dorsolateral prefrontal areas, which 
are generally associated with verbal/semantic knowledge suggesting that object decision 
tasks can be performed by accessing visual knowledge only. This type of task may be 
very useful when examining visual processing in isolation from semantics. As task 
difficulty increased larger parts of the right inferior temporal and anterior fusiform gyri 
were recruited for living objects compared to non-living artefacts. The authors suggest
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that this may support the idea that greater perceptual differentiation is required for living 
objects.
Similar results were reported by Whatmough, Chertkow, Murtha, and Hanratty 
(2002) and Moore and Price (1999). Whatmough et al. reported that naming of animals 
compared with the naming of tools was associated with increased regional Cerebral 
Blood Flow (rCBF) in the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri bilaterally. Moore and 
Price found that naming of living objects compared to naming of non-living artefacts 
resulted in increased rCBF in the posterior portion of the right middle temporal gyrus and 
the anterior temporal lobes. All of the above findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that living objects are more visually similar.
Based on the above results obtained from tests on normal participants it appears as 
though some forms of category-specific deficits for living objects could result from 
damage to the visual processing system. This could be viewed as support for the visual 
crowding hypothesis (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987) and the sensory/functional 
hypothesis (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). However, the differences between living 
objects and non-living artefacts must extend beyond this visual processing differentiation 
because this alone cannot explain the presence of deficits for non-living artefacts in the 
absence of deficits for living objects.
A number of studies have implicated the left ventral premotor cortex (PMv) as 
playing a greater role in the processing of non-living artefacts than living objects (Chao 
& Martin, 2000; Gerlach et al., 2000). This area is believed to be the human homologue 
of the monkey F5 area which has been found to be involved in motor planning tasks such 
as grasping, holding, and manipulating objects (Binkofski et al., 1999). Furthermore,
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Gainotti, Silveri, Daniele, and Guistolisi (1995) observed that patients with category- 
specific deficits for non-living artefacts often have lesions in the area of the PMv. Based 
on these findings Chao and Martin (2000) have suggested that the comprehension of non­
living artefacts may be dependent on motor-based knowledge of object utilization. Devlin 
et al. (2002) have since hypothesized that the left PMv along with the left posterior 
parietal lobe and the left posterior middle temporal region are an important part of the 
dorsal stream forming a visuomotor action network.
Gerlach et al. (2002) attempted to further illuminate the exact role that action 
knowledge may play in the comprehension of non-living artefacts. It does not appear as 
though deficient action knowledge as a whole can explain non-living artefact 
comprehension deficits since it has been shown that patients with apraxia resulting from 
left ffonto-parietal lesions do not necessarily present with comprehension deficits. This 
has been illustrated in studies documenting patients that have preserved knowledge for 
the function of objects that they cannot utilize, or vice versa (Buxbaum, Schwartz, & 
Carew, 1997). This led Buxbaum et al. (1997) to distinguish between “what for” 
knowledge and “how” knowledge, neither of which is necessarily contingent on the other. 
Gerlach et. al (2002) have suggested that the left PMv may act as an interface between 
“what for” knowledge and “how” knowledge, damage to which would result in high-level 
praxis disorders such as ideational apraxia and conceptual apraxia (e.g. using a 
toothbrush like a comb).
Gerlach et. al (2002) reported on a PET study that they interpreted as supporting 
this hypothesis. The authors demonstrated that the left PMv was activated for non-living 
artefacts compared to living objects in a categorization task, but not in a comparison
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between naming of the same non-living artefacts and living objects. They suggest that the 
left PMv was activated during the categorization task and not the naming task because 
action knowledge is composed of information regarding the distinctive actions of objects 
and the act of categorization is based on an analysis of action equivalence.
This explains why the PMv is activated in the categorization but not the naming 
of non-living objects. However, an explanation of why the PMv is activated for non­
living objects and not living objects is still required. This relates to the original 
sensory/functional hypothesis as proposed by Warrington and McCarthy (1983) which 
states that living objects are defined more by their sensory features and non-living objects 
are represented more by their functional (or in this case, motoric) features. Because non­
living objects are more often manipulable they will be more likely to be partly defined by 
motoric features (i.e. how they are manipulated), resulting in activation of the left PMv 
during categorization tasks.
Gerlach, Law, and Paulson (2002) tested this latter hypothesis by examining 
differential left PMv activation between manipulable and non-manipulable objects. They 
found that the left PMv was activated during categorization of both fruits/vegetables and 
articles of clothing compared to categorization of animals and non-manipulable non­
living objects. This supports the hypothesis that action knowledge is not necessarily 
required for the processing of non-living artefacts, but rather for the processing of 
manipulable objects. Left PMv activation is observed more during the categorization of 
non-living objects than living objects because non-living objects tend to be more 
manipulable.
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All of the above evidence strongly implicates that the left PMv is activated during 
the categorization of non-living artefacts. However, this alone is not evidence that left 
PMv activation is necessary to successfully categorize non-living objects. Whether the 
PMv is necessary for comprehension is extremely important. If it is not necessary for the 
comprehension of non-living artefacts then activation of this area during a categorization 
task tells us very little about the presence of category-specific deficits or the organization 
of semantic information in the brain. It is entirely possible that the left PMv is activated 
simply as a result of a motor priming effect. As an attempt at controlling for this 
possibility Gerlach et. al (2002) had participants perform object decision tasks on the 
same fruit/vegetables and articles of clothing that were used in the categorization task. 
Only those areas that showed greater activation in the categorization task than in the 
object decision task were included in further analysis. Further research is necessary, 
however, to adequately control for the possibility of a motor priming effect.
Hope and Buchanan found results supporting the hypothesized role of the PMv in 
processing non-living things in an unpublished study in which normal participants were 
required to categorize a series of line drawings as living or non-living. The categorization 
task was done with and without a distraction task. The distraction task involved 
transferring marbles one at time from one bucket to another with the right hand in attempt 
to engage the left PMv. The distraction task increased reactions times significantly more 
for non-living artefacts than for living things.
The results of the neuroanatomical studies of category specific deficits for living 
and non-living things provide clear evidence for the importance of different structures for 
the processing of each category (Table 1). All of the studies reported in this review
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implicate the inferior, anterior, and mesial portions of the temporal lobe for the 
processing of living things and the left fronto-tempo-parietal area for the processing of 
non-living artefacts. These findings are most consistent with the sensory/functional 
hypothesis and the HIT.
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Table 1: Depicts the neuroanatomical regions that are implicated for processing of living 










Gainotti (2000) X HIT,
Sensory/Functional
Gerlach et al. (1999) X HIT,
Sensory/Functional









Gainotti (2000) X HIT,
Sensory/Functional
Chao et al. (2000) X HIT,
Sensory/Functional
Gerlach et al. (2000) X HIT,
Sensory/Functional
Gainotti et al. (1995) X HIT,
Sensory/Functional
Gerlach et al. (2002) X HIT,
Sensory/Functional
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Summary of Theories of Semantic Category Deficits
The dissociation that has been found to occur between knowledge for living and 
knowledge for non-living things has generated a vast amount of research aimed at 
describing the organization of a semantic system that could accommodate such a pattern 
of deficits.
In the sensory/functional hypothesis the dissociation between living and non­
living things occurs because the knowledge within these categories has differential 
weightings of sensory and functional features. It was initially hypothesized by 
Warrington and McCarthy (1984) and later supported by Farah and McClelleand (1991) 
that knowledge for living things is composed of a greater number of visual/sensory 
features than non-living things which are more reliant on functional information. Thus, 
damage to those parts of semantic memory responsible for sensory features will result in 
a deficit for living things, whereas damage to functional areas will result in a deficit for 
non-living things.
This theory was initially developed because of the finding that the living/non­
living dissociation is not pure; that is, gem stones, musical instruments, and food tend to 
pattern with living things and body parts tend to pattern with non-living things, 
presumably because of the weighting of sensory and functional features of these items 
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1984; Warrington & Shallice, 1987). This hypothesis has 
received the most attention in the literature and arguably the most support. Neuro­
anatomical data show that those areas believed to be responsible for the processing of 
sensory information are damaged in patients with categorical deficits for living things. 
Similarly, those areas believed to be responsible for the processing of motor/functional
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information have been found to be injured in patients with deficits for non-living things 
(Gainotti, 2000). The most damaging finding for the sensory/functional hypothesis is that 
patients with deficits for living things do not always present with deficient sensory 
knowledge of living and non-living things (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998).
Caramazza and colleagues have been the strongest advocates for a truly 
categorical organization of semantic memory. They hypothesize that semantic knowledge 
for living things and non-living things dissociates because each has a separate 
representation within the brain. More specifically, separate neurological structures have 
developed through the process of natural selection for knowledge about animals because 
they are either potential predators or a potential food source, and for knowledge about 
plants as another food source and for medicinal purposes. Later, a separate store for 
knowledge about non-living artefacts developed as tool usage became of increased 
importance.
This hypothesis is generally supported by the double dissociation between living 
and non-living things and the finding that plants and animals often dissociate as well 
(Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Farah & Wallace, 1992; Forde et al., 1997). There are few 
other testable predictions for the categorical hypothesis and support is usually generated 
by reporting results that contradict the predictions of other hypotheses, particularly the 
sensory/functional hypothesis.
In the intercorrelations hypothesis the dissociation occurs because of a greater 
number of intercorrelated features for living things than for non-living things. Because of 
this, any minor damage to the semantic system will result in a deficit for non-living 
things because the large number of intercorrelations for living things is protective when
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the damage is minimal. As the damage progresses whole categories of biological items 
are lost, resulting in a category-specific deficit for living things.
In this theory category-specific deficits result from diffuse damage as opposed to 
more focal lesions. However, there has been very little empirical support for this theory. 
Although Gonnerman et al. (1997) reported that a group of AD patients presented with 
deficits for non-living things at early stages of the disease and deficits for living things as 
impairment progressed, a number of other studies have shown a pattern of impairment 
that does not fit with this model (Garrard et al., 1998; Silveri et al., 1991, Guistolisi et al., 
1993; Whatmough et al., 2003; Zannino et al., 2001). Furthermore, the neuro-anatomical 
data do not fit with the predictions of the intercorrelational hypothesis which states that 
more extensive damage should result in a larger deficit for living things, while less severe 
damage should result in impairment for non-living things. Gainotti (2000) found no 
relationship between the severity of damage and the pattern of category-specific semantic 
deficit.
In the HIT proposed by Humphreys and Forde (2001) the dissociation between 
sensory and functional features of objects is included as well as an elaboration on the 
process of object identification. In the HIT account object recognition proceeds through 
three distinct stages including recognition of the objects structure, access to semantic 
information, and access to the name of the object. Processing can proceed through these 
stages in “cascade” meaning that processing can advance to another stage before 
processing at a prior stage is complete. This is the essence of the cascade model in which 
processing from a later stage can affect processing at an earlier stage through a feedback 
mechanism. Deficits can result from damage to any of the three stages.
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The HIT is better able to accommodate that pattern of deficits that have been 
observed clinically than all other theories of category specific deficits. Unlike the 
sensory/functional hypothesis, the fact that patients with deficits for living things have 
difficulties processing the visual attributes of living things but not of non-living things is 
accounted for. Humphreys and Forde (2001) state that the individual identification of 
living things is more difficult than for non-living things because of greater visual 
crowding. Therefore, in a damaged visual recognition system living things may be 
unidentifiable even though the visual processing of non-living things is intact.
In sum, the most widely researched and referenced theory appears to be the 
sensory/functional hypothesis which has also been supported by neuro-anatomical 
investigations. However, the application of this theory cannot account for all findings 
reported in the literature, indicating that the sensory/functional hypothesis may represent 
a simplification of the actual process that results in category-specific deficits. In the HIT 
account Humphreys and Forde (2001) build upon the distinction between sensory and 
functional features. By doing so they are better able to accommodate all of the available 
research findings. This includes the finding that some patients are able to perform object 
decision tasks for non-living things but not for living things. The HIT explanation for this 
dissociation is that individual identification of living things is more difficult because of 
visual crowding. The research reported in this dissertation examines a possible 
mechanism by which visual crowding affects object recognition.
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Visual Object Recognition
In the proposed model of semantic category deficits for living things visual 
information is viewed as having particular relevance. Subcategories within the category 
of living things (as well as the category of musical instruments, foods, and large non­
living objects) are visually crowded (they have a high degree of visual similarity between 
items within the category) and thus require a more holistic level of processing to 
distinguish among members within the subcategories. The processing of these items is 
hypothesized to be similar to that required for facial recognition and expert object 
recognition. This necessitates a brief discussion of the process of visual object 
recognition.
Tarr and Vuong (2002) categorized various theories of object recognition into two 
primary approaches: structural description and image-based theories. The structural 
description theories are based on the premise that objects are learned by decomposing 
them into a collection of three-dimensional parts and then are remembered by the basic 
configurations of those parts. Recognition occurs by recovering the three-dimensional 
parts from an image and comparing the basic configuration of the parts to those stored in 
object memory.
Biederman (1987) proposed a structural description theory called the recognition- 
by-components (RBC) theory of human image understanding. According to RBC theory, 
all objects are perceived by combining approximately 36 volumetric primitives called 
geons. These geons are perceived on the basis of highly stable non-accidental image 
properties. The term “non-accidental properties” refers to visual images that are unlikely 
to have occurred purely by chance. An example of a non-accidental property is three
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edges meeting at a single point as in an “arrow junction” or a “Y junction”. Such a visual 
property is much more likely to represent the inside or outside edge of a rectangular 
object than to have occurred simply by the chance meeting of random disconnected lines.
Perception of objects occurs as the non-accidental primitives are translated into 
geons which are then combined into a complete configuration referred to as a geon- 
structural description. The spatial relationships between geons are hypothesized to be 
qualitative as opposed to quantitative. This is to satisfy the requirement that identification 
of any particular object can occur from multiple views. To identify an object from a 
collection of geons from multiple views, the relationships of the geons within a specific 
object must be flexible. Thus, the relative positions of the geons within an object are 
known, but the spatial relationships between those goens are not quantified. Such a 
method of object recognition would have difficulty accounting for expert object 
recognition (or the discrimination between the items within living categories), which is 
hypothesized to rely on differences in the relationships among features.
In contrast to the structural description models which state that an object is 
recognized in the same way from any view, proponents of image-based models 
hypothesize that object recognition is actually viewpoint dependent (Tarr and Vuong, 
2002). This means that instead of geons that are detected invariably from any view 
objects are represented as a collection of views with each view representing the features 
of the object under different viewing conditions (Tarr & Vuong, 2002). Tarr, Williams, 
Hayward, and Gauthier (1998) argue that viewpoint dependency requires that as the input 
image of the object deviates from the image created when the object was learned, there 
are resultant decreases in recognition accuracy and speed, proportional to the amount of
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deviation. The authors were able to show that as images of geons were rotated from 0°, to 
45°, to 90° participant’s reaction times on a matching task were increased, supporting the 
hypothesis of the image-based model.
Tarr and Bulthoff (1998) propose a model of feature relationships that they 
describe as somewhere between completely disordered feature representations and rigid 
templates. In this model an object is represented by a local description of the positional 
certainty between various features. The relative positions of the features are probabilistic, 
meaning that variation within an image is tolerated, but recognition performance will 
degrade smoothly as the relative positions of the features deviate further from those in the 
originally learned image. The relationships between the features are organized 
hierarchically into multiple levels of increasing complexity. Thus, the relationship 
between highly associated features at the first level could then be related to other highly 
associated features at a second level.
It is difficult for image-based models to accommodate the recognition of 
exemplars of a given class or the act of classification within a category, which seems to 
require a great deal more flexibility in feature representation and feature relation 
(Hummel, 1998). What Tarr and Bultoff (1998) propose is that both image-based and 
structural description approaches to object recognition may be used by humans. Which 
method is used is dependent on the task characteristics. They suggest that a structural 
description may be used when discrimination between shapes only requires a simple 
ordering of the object features. An image-based description is more likely to be used 
when the relationships between the features are important for discrimination. Such
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relationships are likely necessary for facial recognition, expert object recognition, and as 
suggested in the present paper, the identification of certain living things.
Category Specific Deficits as a Type of Visual Agnosia 
This dissertation tests an explanation of the semantic category specific deficit for 
living items that is based on the hypothesis that category specific deficits for living things 
occur because of a specific type of visual agnosia rather than a semantic memory deficit 
as is hypothesized in the majority of accounts of category specific deficits (Caramazza & 
Shelton, 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Tyler et al., 2002; 
Warrington & Shallice, 1984).
Humphreys and Riddoch (1987a) described certain agnosic patients (referred to as 
integrative visual agnosics) who appear to be unable to integrate the features of objects. 
When the relationships are disrupted or are no longer quantifiable, objects that are 
dependent on these relationships can no longer be recognized. However, such patients are 
able to respond to verbal questions about such objects accurately. Humphreys and 
Riddoch (1987a) differentiated this type of agnosia from semantic agnosia and what is 
often referred to as associative agnosia. In their model of visual recognition integrative 
agnosia represents a disturbance of perception, whereas semantic agnosia occurs because 
of damage to the stored representations of objects. The dissociation between living and 
non-living things is hypothesized to occur in patients with semantic agnosia.
Humphreys and Riddoch (1987b) proposed that category specific deficits for 
living things can occur because living things tend to be more visually crowded than non­
living things. Therefore, more detailed visual processing is required to access the stored 
representations of living things. What is proposed in the present paper is that some
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instances of category specific deficits for living things represent a type of semantic 
agnosia that is category specific because of visual crowding. The explanation for such an 
agnosia incorporates elements from the explanation offered for integrative visual agnosia.
The visual processing of living things is hypothesized to partially involve an 
analysis of the spatial relationships between the features of the items. The stored 
representations of such items are dependent on the quantification of these relationships. 
Therefore, an impaired ability to quantify spatial relationship knowledge will lead to 
impaired ability to access stored structural descriptions of living things. The focus is 
taken away from the visual features in semantic memory (as in the sensory/functional 
hypothesis of Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and is applied to the spatial relationships 
between those features in visual perception.
Viewing visual information as a single entity in perception is too simplistic.
Visual information must be further subdivided into elements such as colour, movement, 
shape, line orientation, etc. The importance of this has not been lost on previous theories 
of semantic memory and has been incorporated into the sensory/functional hypothesis 
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). What has been largely ignored in the literature on 
category specific deficits, however, is the nature of the relationships between whole 
features during normal object recognition.
I hypothesize that perception of living and non-living artefacts differs with respect 
to the amount of configural processing that is required for members of each category. 
Living objects are identified more by holistic processing (an integration of all available 
features into a configural representation), whereas non-living artefacts can be more 
readily identified by single feature recognition. This configural representation of living
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things is represented in an image-based format (Tarr and Vuong, 2002) such that the 
spatial relationships between features are quantified. For example, to recognize an item as 
a dog you not only need to perceive that it has four legs, ears, fur, a tail, and a torso, but 
you have to quantify the relationships among those features in order to differentiate it 
from other similar items (i.e. a cat or a donkey). However, recognition of a shirt can be 
done simply by recognizing the presence of sleeves.
The integrative requirement of many living objects comes from the fact that these 
items tend to have more visual overlap than other non-living items, which is the basis of 
the visual crowding hypothesis (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987b). Based on this, one 
would predict that an individual with a deficit for living things would not have difficulties 
identifying the super-ordinate category of “animal” because an integration of all visual 
features is not required. This has been repeatedly found (Riddoch & Humphreys, 2004).
If a patient can identify a leg, then it must be an animal. This is also supported by studies 
of normal populations which show that subjects have greater difficulty naming living 
objects under time constraints, but show better performance naming super-ordinate 
categories under time constraints or degraded viewing conditions (Humphreys et al.,
1998; Moore & Price, 1999).
Patients with deficits that are labelled as being specific to living objects have a 
tendency to have deficient knowledge for other specific non-living artefacts as well. For 
instance, numerous studies have reported on patients with a “living things” deficit that 
also have deficits for musical instruments, food, large non-living objects, and faces 
(Gainotti, 2000; Saumier, Arguin, & Lassonde, 2001; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; 
1987; 1994; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). What all of these categories appear to have in
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common is that the members are visually crowded. Therefore, to distinguish between 
those members one must rely on the relationships among the various features.
The super-ordinate category of musical instruments has many sub-categories with 
very visually similar items (i.e. members of the brass, woodwind, and reed instruments). 
The same can be said for food items (i.e. different cuts and types of meat and different 
vegetables) and for large man-made objects (i.e. different types of buildings, automobiles, 
and furniture). Thus, an inability to quantify the relationships between visual features 
would be expected to result in deficits for living items, foods, musical instruments, faces, 
and large man-made objects, as well as any other items that require a high degree of 
visual feature integration to distinguish between members of that category.
Non-living artefacts such as clothing, on the other hand, would seem to require 
less integration of visual elements to distinguish between members. Although a sweater is 
visually similar to other articles of clothing with sleeves and a hole for the head, such 
items are fairly limited (except for a clothing “expert”). A sweater is quite distinct from 
most articles of clothing, such as pants or a hat. Therefore, identification does not require 
a detailed analysis of the relationships between its features. Articles of clothing can 
instead be recognized from a single visual element such as the presence of a sleeve.
The following experiments were focussed on testing the hypothesis that animals 
are distinguished from one another based on the relationships among features (configural 
processing) because of increased visual crowding. Participant’s reaction times (RT)’s on 
identification tasks were analyzed in response to images in which the relationships among 
features were disrupted by picture inversion. Picture inversion has been used extensively 
in the study of prosopagnosia as an indicator of configural processing (see discussion).
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Comparisons were made between response time increases from inversion between 
animals and clothing.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants were asked to quickly and accurately indicate whether a picture 
matched a printed word that preceded it. Half of the pictures were animal items and half 
were clothing items. Each participant responded to each picture once in an upright 
position and once in an inverted position. The pictures were presented in random order 
with “Direct RT” software.
The category of animals was selected because of the high degree of visual overlap 
between members of this category (Humphreys et al., 1988). Clothing items were used 
because this category is often differentiated from animals on clinical testing, they are less 
visually crowded, and they have a canonical orientation. The proposed model gives rise 
to the prediction of a main effect of inversion because of a combination of the disruption 
to feature identification and the disruption of the relationships between features. Further, 
this effect should interact with Category reflecting the fact that response times to the 
inverted animals would be increased to a greater extent than would response times to 
inverted clothing. This is based on the hypothesis that living items are identified by the 




Participants were 30 right-handed undergraduate students from the University of 
Windsor, ranging in age from 18 to 40 who volunteered for the study for course credit.
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Materials and Procedure
Participants were asked to indicate whether a line drawing represented the same 
object as a word that immediately preceded it. The participants were then instructed that 
they were going to perform several practice trials before beginning the test trials. Thirty 
practice trials were conducted in which the participants were instructed to indicate 
whether the line drawing matched the word that preceded by pressing “1” for match and 
“2” for non-match on a standard computer keyboard. They were told that the pictures 
may be inverted or upright and to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Following the practice trials the participants began the test trials. Each participant 
responded to 72 picture-word pairs, 36 of which represented animals and 36 of which 
represented items of clothing. They were given the same instructions as during the 
practice trials.
There were 18 pictures of animals and 18 pictures of items of clothing. Each 
picture was presented once in the upright position and once in the inverted position. All 
of the pictures were presented in random order. Half of the 18 animals and the 18 articles 
of clothing were paired with a matching word and the other half of the pictures were 
paired with non-matching words. Half of the participants responded to one half of the 18 
items as non-matching and the other half of the participants responded to the other half of 
the items as non-matching.
All of the non-matching words were taken from the same category as the picture 
that followed them. For example, for both the practice and experimental trials the words 
were presented on the screen for 250 ms, were followed by a 500 ms interstimulus 
interval (ISI), which was followed by the picture for 250ms. The screen remained blank
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until a response was made. Each response was followed by a 1000 ms intertrial interval 
(ITI). The general procedure of a single trial is illustrated in Figure 1. The line drawings 
were taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1983). The drawings were presented on a 
PC monitor with a black background, approximately 60 cm in front of the participants. 
The pictures were presented and the RT’s recorded with “Direct RT” software.
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Figure 1: Illustrates the task sequence and the duration of each part of the sequence. The 
word is first presented for 250 ms, followed by an ISI of 500 ms during which time the 
screen is blank, followed by the picture for 250 ms, immediately followed by the
response phase, during which time the screen remained blank until a response was made. 











1000 ms ITIPicture for 250 ms
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Results
Outliers with RTs greater than 1500 ms were eliminated from the analysis per the 
recommendations of Ratcliff (1993) to maximize the power of the analysis. After removal 
of outlier RTs greater than 1500 ms, correct RTs were entered into a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA. The factors were Category with two levels (animals and clothing) and 
Picture Orientation also with two levels (inverted and upright). There was a main effect 
of Picture Orientation, F ( l ,  29) = 39.472,/? < .001, and Category, F (1,29) -  4.311,/? = 
.047. There was an interaction between Picture Orientation and Category, F  (1,29) = 
4.581,/? = .041 with longer RTs for inverted pictures and a greater inversion effect for 
animals than for clothing (Figure 2).
An error analysis was performed using a chi-square test. There was no effect of 
category x2 (1) -  2.105,/? = .156, or of inversion x2 (1) ~ .896,/? = .344 on the error rates. 
The overall error rate was 3.4 %.
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Figure 2: Presents the mean RTs (ms) with error bars (95% confidence intervals) for 
participants to indicate whether a picture matched the word that preceded it. Each bar 
represents a different picture condition: Animal Upright (n = 30) (where “n” refers to the 
number of subjects); Animal Inverted (n = 30); Clothing Upright (n = 30); and Clothing 
Inverted (n = 30).
■  Animals 
□  Clothing
Upright Inverted
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EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment participants were required to categorize the same set of pictures 
that were matched to words in Experiment 2. A categorization task was chosen because it 
was assumed that the relationships among the features would only be necessary to 
distinguish animals at an individual level. Thus, at a categorical level visual crowding is 
no longer an issue for animals and they can be distinguished based on simple feature 
identification. Therefore, unlike Experiment 1, it was predicted that RTs for the animals 
would be equal to or faster than the RTs for the clothin items that were presented in both 
the upright and inverted orientation.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 30 right-handed undergraduate students from the University of 
Windsor, ranging in age from 18 to 40 who volunteered for the study for course credit. 
Materials and Procedure
Participants were asked to indicate whether a line drawing represented a living or 
a man-made item. The participants were then instructed that they were going to perform 
several practice trials before beginning the test trials. Thirty practice trials were 
conducted in which the participants were instructed to indicate whether the line drawing 
represented a living or a man-made item by pressing “1” for living and “2” for man- 
made. They were told that the pictures may be inverted or upright and to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible.
Participants responded to the same pictures used in Experiment 1 presented under 
identical conditions, for the same duration.
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Results
The correct RTs were subjected to a two-way repeated measures ANOVA. 
Outliers greater than two standard deviations from the mean of all RT’s were removed 
from the data set. The factors were Category with two levels (animals and clothing) and 
Picture Orientation also with two levels (inverted and upright). There was a main effect 
of Picture Orientation, F  (1, 29) = 7.793, p  = .009 and Category, F  (1, 29) = 8.427, p  -  
.007. The interaction between Picture Orientation and Category was not significant, F  (1,
29) = .879, p  = .356 (Figure 3). The RTs were longer when the pictures were inverted and 
when they were pictures of clothing. Unlike the picture-word matching task, RTs were 
not significantly longer for inverted animals than for inverted clothes.
An error analysis was performed using a chi-square test. There was no effect of 
category %2 (1) = .258,/? = .612, or of inversion %2 (1) = .064,/? = .800 on the error rates. 
The overall error rate was 2.9 %.
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Figure 3: Presents the mean RTs (ms) with error bars (95% confidence intervals) for the 
participants to indicate whether a picture represented a living or a non-living item. Each 
bar represents a different picture condition: Animal Upright (n = 30); Animal Inverted (n 
= 30); Clothing Upright (n = 30); and Clothing Inverted (n = 30).
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EXPERIMENT 3
In this experiment participants were again asked to state whether a set of animals 
and a set of man-made objects matched words that preceded them, thereby requiring that 
they be identified at an individual level. The animals used in this experiment were the 
same as those used in Experiment 1, but instead of using clothing, the non-living items 
were selected from categories that were believed to be more visually crowded. The non­
living items used were vehicles, furniture, and buildings. These categories were chosen 
because of their assumed visual crowding that would require differentiation based on the 
spatial relationships of their features. The proposed model results in the prediction that 
these non-living items would be processed in a similar way to the living items, thereby 
nullifying the interaction observed in Experiment 1.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 30 right-handed undergraduate students from the University of 
Windsor, ranging in age from 18 to 40 who volunteered for the study for course credit. 
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except 
that the man-made items used were selected from the sub-categories of vehicles, 
furniture, and buildings. All of the non-matching words were taken from the same sub­
categories.
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Results
The correct RTs were subjected to a two-way repeated measures ANOVA. All 
RTs greater than 1500 ms were removed from the data set. The factors were Category 
with two levels (animals.and non-living items) and Picture Orientation also with two 
levels (inverted and upright). There was a main effect of Picture Orientation, F ( \ ,  29) = 
41.753, p  <.001, but not of Category, F ( l ,  29) = .797, p -  .379. There was no interaction 
between Picture Orientation and Category, F  (1,29) = 356,p  = .555 (Figure 4). The RTs 
were longer when the pictures were inverted. Unlike the results of Experiment 1, RTs 
were not increased more for the living items when they were inverted compared to the 
inverted non-living items (Figure 5).
An error analysis was performed using a chi-square test. There was an effect of 
category x2 (1) = 12.857, p = .000, but not of inversion x2 (1) = .400, p = .527 on the error 
rates. The overall error rate was 4.4 %.
A repeated measures ANOVA was completed with the RT data from Experiments 
1 and 3, with the Experiment (1 and 3) as a between subjects variable. Outliers were 
removed at 1500ms. There was an effect of Experiment, F ( \ ,  58) = 5.483,/? = .023, 
reflecting faster overall reaction times in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 1. There 
was an interaction between Experiment and Category, F  (1, 58) = 4.782, p  = .033.
Neither the Experiment and Orientation, F  (1, 58) = .129,/? = .721, nor the Experiment, 
Category, and Orientation, F ( l ,  58) = 1.042,/? = .312 interactions approached statistical 
significance.
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Figure 4: Presents the mean RTs with error bars (95% confidence intervals) for the 
participants to indicate whether a picture matched the word that preceded it. Each bar 
represents a different picture condition: Animal Upright (n = 30); Animal Inverted (n =
30); Non-living Upright (n = 30); and Non-living Inverted (n = 30). The animal items 
were the same as those used in Experiment 1, but instead of clothing, items were selected 
from vehicles, furniture, and buildings.
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Figure 5: Presents the mean RTs with error bars (95% confidence intervals) shown in 
Figure 1 and Figure 3 included in a single figure. The different picture conditions include 
Animal Upright, Animal Inverted, Non-living Upright and Non-living Inverted.
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DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 were consistent with the predictions of the hypothesis 
that identifying individual living things is more dependent on the relationships between 
features than is the identification of non-living things. The RT’s were increased by 
picture inversion for both categories, but to a greater extent for the animals. According to 
the proposed model, the increase in RT’s for the animals occurred because of a disruption 
to the known relationships between the features of such items, in addition to the 
disruption caused by feature inversion. The increase in RT’s for the clothing, on the other 
hand, was more limited to the effects of the disruption to feature detection because 
quantitative knowledge of the relationships between features is not necessary for 
differentiation of items within this category.
An alternative explanation is that the animals are more difficult to recognize 
because of some confounding factor such as visual complexity or a greater number of 
features in living things. If the recognition of animals requires processing of a greater 
number of features and we predict that inversion also effects feature recognition, then 
inversion would be expected to affect animals more, simply because more inverted 
features need to be processed. However, this is not supported by the RT’s for the pictures 
in the upright orientation which were equal for animals and clothing (actually faster for 
animals, but the difference was not statistically significant).
It still seems possible that a difference between the stimulus properties of the 
categories could account for the differences rather than the processing differences 
required to distinguish between members of the two categories. To control for this, in 
Experiment 2 a group of participants performed a categorization task with the same set of
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stimuli used in Experiment 1 in both the upright and inverted orientations. Again, 
inversion increased the response times across both categories of items. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, however, inversion of the pictures did not increase RT’s more for animals 
than for clothing. This is not consistent with the suggestion that the interaction found in 
Experiment 1 was the result of general stimulus differences between the two categories, 
but indicates that the processing of animals in Experiment 1 was different from the 
processing of clothing.
The proposed model results in the prediction that the interaction observed in 
Experiment 1 would not occur during a categorization task because configural processing 
of the items is only required to differentiate between the highly similar members of 
animals at an individual level. At the categorical level animals need only to be 
differentiated from clothing and this can be done by simple feature detection.
Animals were categorized faster than clothing in both the upright and inverted 
conditions. This provides support for the visual crowding hypothesis that states that 
categorization proceeds quickly for living things because there is greater overlap of the 
features of living things (Humphreys and Riddoch, 1987).
An important element of the current hypothesis that differentiates it from 
hypotheses of semantic category deficits that emphasize a categorical organization of 
semantic memory is that other objects that belong to categories that are visually crowded 
will tend to be processed in a manner that is similar to that for animals. In Experiment 3 
the inversion effect for animals observed in Experiment 1 was contrasted to a group of 
non-living things that were believed to come from more visually crowded categories. 
Because of this, it was hypothesized that the interaction that was observed in Experiment
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1 would not occur in Experiment 3. The results of testing showed an effect of inversion 
for both animals and for the non-living things, in the absence of an interaction between 
category and inversion, confirming the original hypothesis.
In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2 in which there was no effect of category or 
inversion on error rates the results of Experiment 3 revealed higher error rates for the 
non-living things. Based on these findings it could be argued that the non-living things 
used in Experiment 3 were more visually difficult to process than the animals and this is 
why inversion caused increased reaction times, rather than the configural processing of 
such items. However, this is not consistent with the observation that the number of errors 
actually decreased when the non-living things were inverted.
An analysis of the RTs across Experiments 1 and 3 revealed significantly faster 
RTs during Experiment 3. This was true for both the new set of non-living items and for 
the identical set of animals used in Experiment 1. Because RTs were also faster for the 
“animals” category this is likely the result of the characteristics of the sample rather than 
an effect of experimental variables.
In sum, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the animals used were 
processed in a more holistic fashion compared with clothes. Furthermore, the categories 
of furniture, vehicles, and buildings appeared to be processed in a similar manner to 
animals. However, the conclusion that animals are processed more holistically is 
dependent on the hypothesis that inversion affects holistic processing. Evidence for this 
comes from research into prosopagnosia which is discussed in the following section.
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Prosopagnosia, Expert Object Identification, and Living Things
The explanation of deficits for living things provided in the present paper is 
similar to theories offered to explain the deficits of patients with prosopagnosia. Such 
patients are believed to have difficulties with “holistic” processing or “configural” 
processing (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998). Patients with prosopagnosia will 
often describe their experience of face perception as seeing the parts individually and 
losing the whole or the gestalt (Farah, 2004). Although there are a number of different 
theories elaborating on the process of configural processing the majority of researchers 
agree that faces are processed more holistically than other objects (Farah et al., 1998). In 
all elaborations of configural processing the relationships among features are considered 
paramount for accurate perception, as is proposed in this paper.
Farah, Tanaka, and Drain (1995) tested whether the holistic representation of 
faces could explain the face inversion effect. The “face inversion effect” is the term used 
to describe the difficulty that normal individuals have recognizing inverted faces. Farah et 
al., (1995) taught participants to identify random dot patterns and then tested their ability 
to recognize the patterns either upright or inverted. Half of the patterns were presented in 
a manner that encouraged part-based representations. This was done by having each part 
made up of a distinctive colour. The other half of the patterns were presented with all dots 
being black, thereby encouraging a holistic representation. All of the test patterns were 
presented in black. Testing revealed no effect of orientation for the patterns that had been 
encoded in a part-based manner, but a significant inversion effect for those that were 
represented holistically.
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In a second experiment, participants learned to recognize a set of faces. Again, 
half of the faces were learned in a part-wise manner and half were learned holistically. To 
encourage part-wise encoding half of the faces were presented in an “exploded” form, 
such that the parts of the faces were presented separately. The other half of the faces were 
presented normally. All of the faces were then tested in a normal format. There was only 
an inversion effect for the faces that were learned normally. The inversion effect was 
absent when the faces were learned part-wise. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the inversion effect is the result of a disruption to holistic processing and 
supports the current conclusions that living things are processed more holistically.
The inversion effect is not unique to face recognition, but has been observed 
under conditions requiring expert object recognition as well, suggesting that holistic 
processing is important for both tasks. Expert recognition refers to the differentiation of 
visually similar items within a category by an individual that has a great deal of 
experience with that category. For instance, Diamond and Carey (1986) showed that dog 
recognition by dog experts was sensitive to inversion effects that were comparable in 
magnitude to the face inversion effect. In contrast, non-dog experts showed only a face 
inversion effect in the absence of a dog inversion effect. The authors argued that the 
holistic processing of faces is actually a specific instance of expert object recognition and 
any other items that are processed “expertly” will be processed holistically.
Further support for the hypothesis that expert object identification relies on 
holistic processing comes from two studies performed by de Gelder and colleagues. De 
Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, and Degos (1998) found that normal subjects produced an 
inversion effect for both faces and a set of subtly different shoes. Shoes were chosen
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because they tend to be highly visually similar, but have a number of different exemplars. 
Also, much like faces, shoes have a canonical orientation, de Gelder and Rouw (2000) 
extended these findings with a prosopagnosic patient who showed an “inverted inversion 
effect” for the set of faces and the set of shoes. The inverted inversion effect refers to the 
improved learning and recognition of items that are presented inverted in patients with 
prosopagnosia. This is believed to occur because the holistic processing module is 
engaged when the item is presented upright even though that module is damaged (Farah, 
2004).
Guathier and Tarr (1997) specifically tested the effects of expert object processing 
by training a group of participants to discriminate “greebles”. They examined whether 
such participants who were trained to discriminate one set of pictures of greebles would 
then show configural processing of a new set of unfamiliar greebles. “Greebles” are 
digitally created three-dimensional objects each with four protruding parts organized in 
approximately the same configuration. Each greeble was a member of one of two genders 
and one of five families. The five families were defined by a different central part shape. 
The genders were differentiated by the orientation of the other parts relative to the central 
part. Although some of the parts were very similar to each other, each was unique to the 
individual greeble. The authors reported that their group of greeble experts were slower 
to identify the parts of novel greebles when those parts were in a different configuration 
than during training. This was only the case for greebles presented in the upright 
orientation. Novice identification of parts was not sensitive to the configuration used 
during the study phase. These results suggest that the “experts” had learned a configural 
representation of the parts of the greebles similar to that observed in facial recognition.
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Gautheir, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, and Gore (1999) provided further support 
for the hypothesis that holistic face processing is simply an example of expert object 
recognition by examining activity in the fusiform face area (FFA) during processing of 
greebles and faces. To do this the authors examined the difference in FFA activity on 
fMRI between upright and inverted faces and between upright and inverted greebles.
Prior to training there was a greater difference in FFA activity between upright and 
inverted faces than between upright and inverted greebles. Following training with 
greebles (and with faces as a control condition) the difference in activity in the FFA 
between matching of upright greebles versus matching of inverted greebles increased 
dramatically. This area was also more activated in passive viewing of greebles by experts 
than by novices. It was concluded that expertise is one factor that encourages activation 
in the FFA.
The results of the current experiments suggest that the individual identification of 
animals requires more holistic processing than the individual identification of clothes. 
Furthermore, other objects that come from visually crowded categories may also be 
processed holistically as indicated by the significant effect of inversion for buildings, 
vehicles, and furniture. This form of processing may be similar to that observed for shoes 
(de Gelder et al., 1998), expert dog identification (Diamond and Carey, 1986), and expert 
greeble identification (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997). The processing of visually crowded 
categories may be an example of expert object processing.
Research mentioned in the introduction of this paper also supports the hypothesis 
that living things are processed by regions of the brain that have been implicated in the 
expert object recognition research discussed above. Gerlach et al. (1999) found that larger
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parts of the right inferior temporal and anterior fusiform gyri were recruited for living 
objects compared to artefacts. Whatmough et al. (2002) reported that naming of animals 
compared with the naming of tools was associated with increased regional Cerebral 
Blood Flow (rCBF) in the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri bilaterally. Moore and 
Price (1999) found that naming of living objects compared to naming of non-living 
artefacts resulted in increased rCBF in the posterior portion of the right middle temporal 
gyrus and the anterior temporal lobes. In a meta-analysis Gainotti (2000) found that 
deficits for living things were associated with inferior temporal lobe damage, in contrast 
to deficits for non-living things which were associated with ffonto-temporo-parietal 
lesions. All of the above findings are consistent with the hypothesis that living objects are 
more visually similar and are processed more holistically than are non-living things.
Semantic Deficit or Visual Agnosia?
The results of the current experiments in conjunction with the literature on the 
anatomical processing of living things provides strong evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that living things are processed more holistically than are non-living things. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that this is the result of the visual crowding of the category 
of living things (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987). It is difficult for the current results to be 
accommodated by many of the prevailing theories of category specific deficits because 
they focus on damage to “semantic memory” as the locus of the deficits and were not 
intended to address the perceptual processing of objects. However, for this same reason 
the results do not refute any of the hypotheses regarding the organization of semantic 
memory.
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The results are best interpreted within the visual crowding hypothesis and provide 
a possible mechanism by which visual crowding affects the process of differentiating 
between objects. It is possible to incorporate this mechanism within the HIT account 
(Humphreys & Forde, 2001), much like the visual crowding hypothesis has been. Within 
this model the re-entrant activation of visual processing would be represented by entry 
into a “holistic processing module” which would only be required to differentiate 
between living things and other items from visually crowded categories. Damage to this 
area would then lead to a category specific deficit for living things.
It is clear that any model explaining category specific deficits will have to account 
for differences in holistic processing between categories. Research indicates that areas of 
the fusiform gyrus may be necessary for such processing to take place and, therefore, any 
damage to this area is likely to result in deficits processing those objects that require 
holistic processing to be differentiated.
The question remains as to whether a holistic processing deficit can account for 
the deficits observed in patients with a dissociation between their knowledge for living 
and non-living things. It is possible that for certain living items an inability to 
differentiate individual items visually would result in a loss of all “semantic” information 
for those items as well. For instance, animals may be differentiated almost entirely based 
on their subtly different visual features for most individuals. Therefore, if they cannot be 
differentiated at the visual level they cannot be differentiated semantically. In contrast, an 
individual may differentiate people based on their face, their voice, and their relationship 
to that individual. If this individual is no longer able to differentiate faces because of a 
holistic processing deficit this will result in prosopagnosia, but all knowledge of people
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they have relationships with will not be lost because of the intact connections to voice 
information and relationship information that can also be used to differentiate individuals. 
This provides a reasonable explanation for why prosopagnosia and “semantic” category 
deficits for living things are so highly correlated (Farah, 2004).
Thomas and Forde (2006) recently came to a similar conclusion in their 
examination of a patient with a category specific deficit for living things. This patient was 
faster at identifying local compared to global letters (letters made up of smaller letters) 
and showed no local-to-global or global-to-local interference effects in a selective 
attention task. From this the authors hypothesized that it was this difficulty processing 
visual information globally that resulted in the patient’s category specific deficit for 
living things.
This hypothesis allows for variability in the presentation of deficits resulting from 
an inability to process the spatial relationships among details depending on the 
individuals learning history. For instance, some individuals may present with only a 
visual agnosia for living things if they have adequate connections in other modalities to 
distinguish between individual items (i.e. verbal, auditory, gustatory, tactile, or motor). 
Such patients have been identified in the literature (Arguin, Bub, & Dudek, 1996; 
Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987).
This is not to say that all reports of category specific deficits for living things can 
be accounted for by this mechanism. Although such patients are rare, De Renzi and 
Lucchelli (1994) have reported on a patient with deficient knowledge for living things 
with intact face recognition abilities.
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Humphreys and Forde (2001) distinguished between two types of patients with 
deficits for living things that have been described in the literature. One type, such as the 
patient reported on by Caramazza and Shelton (1998), has an inability to perform 
accurately on an object decision task for living things in addition to deficits for living 
things on tasks presented in various modalities. This is the type of patient that, according 
to the present model, would also present with difficulties with face recognition. 
Humphreys and Forde argue that this type of patient has difficulties distinguishing 
between visually similar items because of a disruption to the process of re-entrant 
activation. Such a patient could also be conceptualized as having an impaired ability to 
process the configural relationships in visual object identification.
Another type, such as the patient described by Laiacona et al. (1997), has deficits 
for living things with an intact ability to perform object decision tasks. Humphreys and 
Forde (2001) argue that this type of patient has category specific damage at the semantic 
level, as opposed to the visual recognition level. The difficulty with classifying patients 
as having a “semantic” deficit because of intact object recognition is that intact object 
recognition may not, in fact, equate to intact configural processing abilities. Individual 
object identification is likely to require a more fine grained analysis of the visual 
properties of an object than is required for object decision tasks. Furthermore, object 
decision tasks will very greatly from study to study based on the different parts that have 
been connected to create non-objects. Perhaps a more accurate test of configural 
processing abilities would be a test of facial recognition.
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of the current study indicate that living things are processed more by 
their holistic configuration than are non-living artefacts. Such processing is hypothesized 
to be similar to that observed for facial recognition and expert object recognition and 
requires the application of an image-based processing model (Tarr & Vuong, 2002). 
Given these findings it is possible that prior instances of category-specific deficits for 
living things have resulted from an inability to process the spatial relationships between 
the features of living things. Previous research suggests that this may be because of the 
increased visual crowding of living things (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1987b). The results 
of this study support this hypothesis, showing that other types of non-living artefacts that 
are more visually crowded can also be affected by disruption to the configural 
relationships that differentiate the items. The fact that prosopagnosia is so highly 
correlated with category-specific deficits for living things supports this hypothesis.
The reverse pattern of deficits, category specific deficits for non-living artefacts, 
is not addressed by these results. However, research suggests that action knowledge is 
particularly important for processing this category of items (Gerlach et al., 2002).
Future investigations of patients with category specific deficits for living things 
must be careful to examine the visual processing abilities of such individuals, particularly 
with respect to configural processing. The object decision task may not be entirely 
sensitive to deficits of configural processing depending on the nature of the “non-objects” 
that are created. Perhaps a more accurate indication of configural processing abilities 
would be a test of facial recognition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
REFERENCES
Arguin, M., Bub, D., & Dudek, G. (1996). Shape integration for visual object 
recognition and its implication in category-specific visual agnosia. Visual Cognition, 3, 
221-275.
Basso, A., Capitani, E., & Laiacona, M. (1988). Progressive language impairment 
without dementia: A case study with isolated category-specific semantic defects. Journal 
o f Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 51, 1201-1207.
Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition-by-components: A theory of human image 
understanding. Psychological Review, 94, 115-147.
Binkofski, F., Buccino, G., Dole, C., Seitz, R. J., & Freund, H. J. (1999). Mirror 
agnosia and mirror ataxia constitute different parietal lobe disorders. Annuls o f  
Neurology, 96, 51-61.
Brousseau, G. & Buchanan, L. (2004). Semantic category effect and emotional 
valence in female university students. Brain and Language, 90, 241-248.
Bullier, J. (2002). Neural basis of vision. In Pashler, Hal & Yantis, Steven, (Eds.) 
Steven’s Handbook o f Experimental Psychology (3rd Ed.): Sensation and Perception, (pp. 
1-40). John Wiley and Sons: New Jersey, US.
Buxbaum, L. J., Shwartz, M. F., & Carew, T. G. (1997). The role of semantic 
memory in object use. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 14, 219-254.
Caramazza. A., & Shelton, J. R. (1998). Domain-specific knowledge systems in 
the brain: the animate-inanimate distinction. Journal o f Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 1-34.
Caramazza, A., Hillis, A. E., Rapp, B. C., & Romani, C. (1990). The multiple 
semantics hypothesis: Multiple confusions? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 7, 161-189.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
Chao, L. L., Haxby, J. V., & Martin, A. (1999). Attribute-based neural substrate 
in posterior temporal cortex for perceiving and knowing about objects. Nature 
Neuroscience, 2, 913-919.
Chao, L. L & Martin, A. (2000). Representation of manipulable man-made 
objects in the dorsal stream. Neuroimage, (12), 478-484.
Damasio, A. R. (1990). Category-related recognition defects as a clue to the 
neural substrates of knowledge. Trends in Neuroscience, 13, 95-98.
De Gelder, B., Bachoud-Levi, A. C., & Degos, J. (1998). Inversion superiority in 
visual agnosia may be common to a variety of orientation polarised objects besides faces. 
Vision Research, 38(18), 2855-2861.
De Gelder, B. & Rouw, R. (2000). Paradoxical configuration effects for faces and 
objects in prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 38(9), 1271-1279.
De Renzi, E., & Lucchelli, F. (1994). Are semantic systems separately represented 
in the brain? The case of living category impairment. Cortex, 30, 3-25.
Devlin, J. T., Gonnerman, L. M., Andersen, E. S., & Seidenberg, M. S. (1998). 
Category-specific semantic deficits in focal and widespread brain damage: A 
computational account. Journal o f  Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 77-94.
Diamond, R. & Carey, S. (1986). Why faces are and are not special: an effect of 
expertise. Journal o f Experimental Psychology, 115, 107-117.
Farah, M. J. (2004). Visual Agnosias (2nd Ed.). MIT Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
Farah, M. J., & McClelland, J. L. (1991). A computational model of semantic 
memory impairment: modality specificity and emergent category specificity. Journal o f  
Experimental Psychology: General, 120, 339-357.
Farah, M. J., Tanaka, J. R., & Drain, H. M. (1995). What causes the face inversion 
effect? Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 
628-634.
Farah, M. J., & Wallace, M. A. (1992). Semantically-bounded anomia: 
Implications for the neural implementation of naming. Neuropsychologia, 30, 609-621.
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, H. M., & Tanaka, J. R. (1998). What is 
“special” about face perception? Psychological Review, 105, 482-498.
Forde, E. M. E., Francis, D., Riddoch, M. J., Rumiati, R., & Humphreys, G. W. 
(1997). On the links between visual knowledge and naming: A single case study of a 
patient with a category-specific impairment for living things. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 
14, 403-458.
Funnell, E., & De Momay Davies, P. (1996). JBR: A reassessment of concept 
familiarity and a category-specific disorder for living things. Neurocase, 2, 461-474.
Gaffan, D., & Heywood, C. A. (1993). A spurious category-specific visual 
agnosia for living things in normal human and nonhuman primates. Journal o f Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 5, 118-128.
Gainotti, G. (2000). What the locus of brain lesions tells us about the nature of 
cognitive deficits underlying category-specific disorders: a review. Cortex, 36, 539-559.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
Gainotti, G., & Silveri, M. C. (1996). Cognitive and anatomical locus of lesion in 
a patient with a category-specific semantic impairment for living beings. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 13, 357-390.
Gainotti, G., & Silveri, M. C., Daniele, A., & Guistolisi, L. (1995). 
Neuroanatomical correlates of category-specific semantic disorders: A critical survey. 
Memory, 3, 247-262.
Gale, T. M., Done, D. J., & Frank, R. J. (2001). Visual crowding and category 
specific deficits for pictorial stimuli: A neural network model. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 18, 509-550.
Garrard, P., Patterson, K., Watson, P. C., & Hodges, J. R. (1998). Category- 
specific semantic loss in dementia of Alzheimer’s type. Brain, 121, 633-646.
Gauthier, I., Behremann, M., & Tarr, J. J. (1999). Can face recognition really be 
dissociated from object recognition? Journal o f Cognitive Neuroscience, 11, 349-370.
Gautheir, I. & Tarr, J. J. (1997). Becoming a “greeble” expert: Exploring 
mechanisms for face recognition. Vision Research, 37, 1673-1682.
Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about 
relevant data: Number and the animate-inanimate distinction as examples. Cognitive 
Science, 14, 79-106.
Gelman, S. (1988). The development of induction within living kind and artefact 
categories. Cognitive Psychology, 20 ,65-95.
Gerlach, C., Law, I., Gade, A., & Paulson, O. B. (1999). Perceptual differentiation 
and category effects in normal object recognition: A PET study. Brain, 122, 2159-2170.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
Gerlach, C., Law, I., Gade, A., & Paulson, O. B. (2000). Categorization and 
category effects in normal object recognition: A PET study. Neuropsychologia, 38, 1693- 
1703.
Gonnerman, L. M., Andersen, S. E., Devlin, J. T., Kempler, D., & Seidenberg, M. 
S. (1997). Double dissociation of semantic categories in Alzheimer’s disease. Brain and 
Language, 57, 254-279.
Goodale, M. A., Milner, A. D., Jakobson, L. S., & Carey, D. P. (1991). A 
neurological dissociation between perceiving objects and grasping them. Nature, 349, 
154-156.
Guistolisi, L., Bartolomeno, P., Daniele, A., Marra, C., & Gainotti, G. (1993). 
Category-specific semantic impairment for living things in the early stages of 
Alzheimer’s disease: Further evidence from a study on single cases. Journal o f Clinical 
and Experimental Neuropsychology, 15, 403.
Hillis, A, E., & Caramazza, A. (1991). Category-specific naming and 
comprehension impairment: a double dissociation. Brain, 114, 2081-2094.
Hummel, J. E. (1998). Where view-based theories break down: The role of 
structure in shape perception and object recognition. In: Dietrich, E. Markman, A. (Eds.), 
Cognitive Dynamics: Conceptual Change in Humans and Machines. MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA.
Humphreys, G. W., & Forde, E. M. E. (2001). Hierarchies, similarity, and 
interactivity in object recognition: "Category-specific" neuropsychological deficits. 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 24, 453-509.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. J. (1987b). On telling your fruit from your 
vegetables: A consideration of category-specific deficits after brain damage. Trends in 
Neuroscience, 10, 145-148.
Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. J. (1987a). To see but not to see: A case study 
o f visual agnosia. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Humphreys, G. W., & Riddoch, M. J. (1999). Impaired development of semantic 
memory: Separating semantic from structural knowledge and diagnosing a role for action 
in establishing stored memories for objects. Neurocase, 5, 519-532.
Humphreys, G. W., Riddoch, M. J., & Quinlan, P. T. (1988). Cascade processes 
in picture identification. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 85, 67-103.
Jarvis, B. G. (2002). Direct RT Research Software (2002 version). New York: 
Empirisoft.
Jones, E. G., & Powell, T. P. S. (1970). An experimental study of converging 
sensory pathways within the cerebral cortex of the monkey. Brain, 93, 793-820.
Kolinsky, R., Fery, P., Messina, D., Peretz, I., Evinck, S., Ventura, P., Morais, J. 
(2002). The fur of the crocodile and the mooing sheep: A study of a patient with a 
category-specific impairment for biological things. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 19, 301- 
342.
Laiacona, M., Barabarotto, R., & Capitani, E. (1997). Semantic category 
dissociations: A longitudinal study of two cases. Cortex, 33, 441-461.
Logothetis, N. K., Paulis, J., Poggio, T. (1995). Shape representation in the 
inferior temporal cortex of monkeys. Current Biology, 5(5), 552 -  563.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
Mandler, J. M., Bauer, P. J., & McDonough, L. (1991). Separating the sheep from 
the goats: Differentiating global categories. Cognitive Psychology, 23, 263-298.
McRae, K., de Sa, V. R., & Seidenberg, M. S., (1997). On the nature and scope of 
featural representations of word meaning. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 
126, 99-130.
Moore, C. J. & Price, C. J. (1999). A functional neuroimaging study of the 
variables that generate category-specific object processing differences, Brain, 122, 943- 
962.
Moss, E. H., & Tyler, L. (1997). A category-specific semantic deficit for non­
living things in a case of progressive aphasia. Brain and Language, 60, 55-58.
Moss, E. H., & Tyler, L. (2000). A progressive category-specific deficit for non­
living things. Neuropsychologia, 38, 60-82.
Moss, E. H., Tyler, L., Durrant-Peatfield, M., Bunn, E. M. (1998). Two eyes of a 
see-through: impaired and intact semantic knowledge in a case of selective deficit for 
living things. Neurocase, 4, 291-310.
Ratcliff, R. (1993). Methods for dealing with reaction time outliers. Psychological 
Bulletin, 114, 510-532.
Riddoch, M. J. & Humphreys, G. W. (2004). Object identification in 
simultanagnosia: when wholes are not the sum of their parts. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 
21, 423-441.
Saumier, D., Arguin, M., & Lassonde, M. (2001). Prospagnosia: a case study 
involving problems in processing configural information. Brain and Cognition, 46, 255- 
259.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
Shallice, T. (1988). Specialisation within the semantic system. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 5, 133-142.
Silveri, M. C., Daniele, A., Guistolisi, L, & Gainotti, G. (1991). Dissociation 
between knowledge of living and non-living things in dementia of the Alzheimer’s type. 
Neurology, 41, 545-546.
Silveri, M. C., & Gainotti, G. (1988). Interaction between vision and language in 
category-specific semantic impairment. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 5, 677-709.
Silveri, M. C., Gainotti, G., Perani, D., Cappelletti, J. YU., Carbone, G., & Fazio, 
F. (1997). Naming deficit for nonliving items: Neuropsychological and PET study. 
Neuropsychologia, 35, 359-387.
Snodgrass, J. G., & Vanderwart, M. (1980). A standardized set of 260 pictures: 
Norms for name agreement, image agreement, familiarity, and visual complexity. Journal 
o f  Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 174-215.
Stewart, F., Parkin, A. J., & Hunkin, N. M. (1992). Naming impairments 
following recovery from herpes simplex encephalitis. Quarterly Journal o f  Experimental 
Psychology, 44, 261-284.
Tarr, M. J. & Bulthoff, H. H. (1998). Image-based object recognition in man, 
monkey and machine. Cognition, 67, 1 -2 0 .
Tarr, M. J. & Vuong, Q. C. (2002). Visual object recognition. In H. Pashler & S. 
Yantis (Eds.) Steven’s Handbook o f  Experimental Psychology. Volume 1: Sensation and 
Perception (pp. 287 -  314). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
Tarr, M. J., Williams, P., Hayward, W. G., & Gauthier, I. (1998). Three- 
dimensional object recognition is viewpoint-dependent. Nature Neuroscience, 1(4), U S-  
211 .
Thomas, R. & Forde, E. (2006). The role of local and global processing in the 
recognition of living and nonliving things. Neuropsychologia, 44, 982-986.
Thompson-Schill, S. L., Aquirre, G. K., D’Esposito, M., & Farah, M. J. (1999). A 
neural basis for category and modality specificity of semantic knowledge. 
Neuropsychologia, 37, 671-676.
Tyler, L. K., Moss, H. E., Durrant-Peatfield, M. R., & Levy, J. P. (2000). 
Conceptual structure and the structure of concepts: A distributed account of category 
specific deficits. Brain and Language, 75, 195-213.
Warrington, E. K. (1975). The selective impairment of semantic memory. 
Quarterly Journal o f  Experimental Psychology, 27, 635-657.
Warrington, E. K., & McCarthy, R. (1983). Category-specific access dysphasia. 
Brain, 106, 859-878.
Warrington, E. K., & McCarthy, R. (1987). Categories of knowledge: further 
fractionations and an attempted integration. Brain, 110, 1273-1296.
Warrington, E. K., & McCarthy, R. (1994). Multiple meaning systems in the 
brain: A case for visual semantics. Neuropsychologia, 32, 1465-1473.
Warrington, E. K., & Shallice, T. (1984) Category-specific semantic impairments. 
Brain, 107, 829-859.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
Whatmough, C., Chertkow, H., Murtha, S., & Hanratty, K. (2002). Dissociable 
brain regions process object meaning and object structure during picture naming. 
Neuropsychologia, 40, 174-186.
Whatmough, C., Chertkow, H., Murtha, S., Templeman, D., Babins, L., & Kelner, 
N. (2003). The semantic category effect increases with worsening anomia in Alzheimer’s 
type dementia. Brain and Language, 84, 134-147.
Van Orden, G. C., Pennington, B. F., & Stone, G. O. (2001). What do double 
dissociations prove? Cognitive Science, 25, 111-172.
Zannino, G. D., Perri, R., Giovanni, A., Carlesimo, P. P., & Caltagirone, C.
(2002). Category-specific impairments in patients with Alzheimer’s disease as a function 
of disease severity: a cross-sectional investigation. Neuropsychologia, 40, 2268-2279.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
APPENDIX A: Stimulus set
Animals
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APPENDIX B: ANOVA tables for each experiment
Experiment 1
Effect F-vaiue Significance Eta Squared
Category (1,29) = 4.31 .047 .129
Orientation (1,29) = 39.47 .000 .576
Category * Orientation (1,29) = 4.58 .041 .136
Experiment 2
Effect F-value Significance Eta Squared
Category (1,29) = 8.43 .007 .225
Orientation (1,29) = 7.79 .009 .212
Category * Orientation (1,29) = .88 .356 .029
Experiment 3
Effect F-value Significance Eta Squared
Category (1,29) = .80 .379 .027
Orientation (1,29) = 41.75 .000 .590
Category * Orientation (1,29) = .36 .555 .012
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Experiments 1 and 3 Interactions
Effect F-value Significance Eta Squared
Category * Experiment (1,58) = 4.78 .033 .076
Orientation * Experiment (1,58) = .129 .721 .002
Category * Orientation * 
Experiment
(1,58)=  1.04 .312 .018
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